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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final Order of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Plaintiff

appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.

The Utah

Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code Annotated (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court correctly amended its prior

Order dated January 2, 1996?

Whether an ambiguity exists is a

question of law for which this Court accords no deference to the
trial court's decision. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil
& Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). With
regard to the mistake of fact claim, mistake of fact is an action
based in equity, for which appellate courts will reverse a trial
court's finding only if it is clearly erroneous.

Despain v.

Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1993); Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989).
II.

Whether Appellee Plumb is entitled to an award of

his attorney's fees incurred in this appeal?

f!

[A] provision for

payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if
the action is brought to enforce the contract." Salmon v. Davis
County, 916 P.2d 890, 896 (Utah 1996) (quoting Management Services
v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980)). MorePLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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over, "the prevailing party in a dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision [is] entitled, not only to attorney fees on
appeal, but also to the fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled to be indemnified,"
Salmon, 916 P.2d at 895; James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888
P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional provisions are set forth in the addendum where not set forth fully in
the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The history of this relatively simple case is rather long
and tortuous.

The case began as an action based upon an alleged

breach by Appellee and Defendant Kevin Plumb
Earnest Money Sales Agreement.

("Plumb") of an

Appellant and Plaintiff Larry R.

Vonwald asserted in his Complaint that Plumb breached the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement by failing to perform his obligations under
the contract (R. 2-3) . Plumb counterclaimed against Vonwald seeking return of his earnest money deposit based upon the failure of
a condition precedent contained within the contract (R. 7-10).
Plumb filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which motion
was granted after a hearing on the matter (R. 28) . By Order dated
June 8, 1994, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
Plumb, ordered that the earnest money deposit of $5,000.00 be
PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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returned to Plumb, and awarded Plumb attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $4,067.90 (R. 229-32).

The June 8th Order further

provided for augmentation of Plumb's attorney's fees award for fees
expended in collecting Plumb's judgment (R. 231).
Vonwald subsequently appealed the June 8th Order, which
appeal was heard by the Utah Court of Appeals as Case No. 94-731-CA
(R. 281) . In connection with the appeal, Vonwald posted a supersedes bond in the amount of $5,500.00 (R. 246) . Without oral argument, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's June 8th
Order in a Memorandum Decision dated May 25, 1995 and remanded the
matter to the trial court for a determination of attorney's fees to
be awarded to Plumb on appeal (R. 287-88).

Vonwald then filed a

Petition for Rehearing with the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 311-19),
which petition was denied (R. 323).
Vonwald then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 320) .

The Utah Supreme Court denied

Vonwald's petition on December 5, 1995 (R. 326). Plumb then submitted a Motion for Release of Cash Bond and a Motion for Entry of
Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. 327-47) . In the December 12th, 1995 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment
for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Plumb requested an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal in the total amount of $5,475.44 (R.
327-47).
Thereafter, the parties entered into a Stipulation for
Release of Cash Bond ("Stipulation") (R. 348-49) wherein the parties recited that "Defendant has filed a Motion for Entry of JudgPLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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ment for Attorney's Fees and Costs which is pending before this
Court."

(R. 348).

The Stipulation also included the following

paragraph:
4.
Upon the receipt of funds by Defendant's counsel as
specified herein, Plaintiff shall be deemed to have satisfied
all obligations in favor of the Defendant and the Order of the
Court shall reflect the same.
(R. 349).
On or about January 2, 1996, the trial court entered the
Order for Release of Cash Bond (R. 350) . Thereafter, on January 5,
1996, Plumb filed a partial Satisfaction of Judgment, containing
the following language:
Nothing herein shall be construed as a Satisfaction
of that certain Judgment in the sum of $4,064.90 rendered
in this matter against Plaintiff Larry R. Vonwald and in
favor of the Defendant Kevin Plumb, which Judgment was
docketed in this Court on or about the 8th day of June,
1994, which judgment, together with interest and costs
remains outstanding as of this date.
(R. 353).
Disputing Plumb's entry of the partial Satisfaction of
Judgment, Vonwald filed a Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment
(R. 356). Plumb responded to Vonwald's motion by filing a Motion
to Amend Order (R. 394-96) and a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction and to Stay Execution and in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Order (R. 397-407).
Vonwald's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment and
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order came on for before the trial court on
April 1, 1996.

Vonwald offered absolutely no evidence either at

the hearing or prior to the hearing in the form of affidavit testi-

PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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mony to contradict the facts presented by Plumb in support of
Plumb's claims of ambiguity in the settlement agreement or mistake
of fact (R. 356-91).

From the hearing, the trial court denied

Vonwald's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment and granted
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order (R. 443). Vonwald thereafter objected to the Proposed Order and in support of his objection, offered
the same arguments he had advanced in support of his Motion for
Full Satisfaction and in Opposition to Plumb's Motion to Amend (R.
444-50).

Plumb then responded to Vonwald's objection by filing a

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order
(R. 451-456) .
Without the necessity of another hearing on the matter,
the trial court entered its Order dated April 24, 1996 granting
Plumb's Motion to Amend Order and denying Vonwald's Motion for Full
Satisfaction of Judgment (R. 460-64). The trial court then entered
a final Order and Judgment on May 14, 1996, in substantively the
same form as the April 24th Order (R. 469-72).
Vonwald thereafter filed his Notice of Appeal appealing
from the Orders dated April 24, 1996 and May 14, 1996 (R. 475).
The trial court ordered a cash supersedeas bond to be set by
Vonwald in the amount of $6,700.00 relative to this appeal (R. 48283).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
All of the facts relevant to the determination of the
issues presented in this appeal are set forth above in Statement of
the Case.
PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Most of the claims raised by Vonwald on appeal were not
properly preserved below, and not properly addressed on appeal
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Accordingly, these claims should not be considered by this Court.
For instance, prior to this appeal, Vonwald had never raised the
issue of whether Plumb's Motion to Amend Order conformed with the
requirements of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

As

for Vonwald's Rule 60(b) issue, Vonwald has advanced on appeal no
citation to the record and no legal analysis.

Similarly, Vonwald

has been dilatory in addressing the issues of due process and judicial estoppel in his brief.

Where Vonwald has raised issues for

the first time on appeal, has failed to adequately cite to the
record, and has advanced no significant legal analysis, this Court
should presume the correctness of the trial court's decision.
With regard to Vonwald's challenge to the reasonableness
of the attorney's fees awarded to Plumb, Plumb asserts that this
claim constitutes a violation of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Vonwald never challenged the reasonableness

of the attorney's fees to the trial court.

In fact, the evidence

before the trial court indicated that Vonwald had agreed to the
amount of attorney's fees sought by and awarded to Plumb.

To now

challenge on appeal the reasonableness of the attorney's fees
awarded to Plumb is utterly frivolous.

Consequently, this Court

should sanction Vonwald pursuant to Rule 40 for pursuing this

PLUMB2 BRF (AN)
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frivolous claim by imposing an award to Plumb of his attorney's
fees incurred in defending against this appeal.
The only remaining issue advanced by Vonwald on appeal is
his claim that the Stipulation between the parties was not ambiguous.

The evidence presented to the trial court does not support

Vonwald's assertions on appeal.

The language of the Stipulation

was ambiguous as the trial court correctly determined.

Moreover,

the ambiguity of the Stipulation was not the only grounds upon
which the trial court granted Plumb's Motion to Amend Order.

The

trial court also correctly determined that the January 1996 Order
should be reformed on the basis of mistake of fact.

Accordingly,

independent grounds exist for this Court's affirmation of the trial
court's May 14, 1996 Order amending the January 1996 Order.
Lastly, Plumb is entitled to an award of his attorney's
fees incurred in defending against this latest appeal. This entitlement is based upon (i) the language of the Earnest Money Purchase Agreement between the parties as well as (ii) Vonwald's violation of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, Plumb requests that this court remand the issue of Plumb's
attorney's fees on this appeal to the trial court for determination.
ARGUMENT
Vonwald's Brief of Appellant appears to present a myriad
of issues for this Court's consideration on appeal, most of which
merit little if any attention.

Moreover, none of the issues pre-

PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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sented by Vonwald bear upon the ultimate issue of whether the trial
court correctly entered its Order dated May 14, 1996.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED
ITS ORDER DATED MAY 14, 1996.

In his appellate brief, Vonwald advances five arguments
in support of his claim that the trial court erred in entering its
Order dated May 14, 1996: (i) that the Stipulation between the
parties was not ambiguous, and therefore must be enforced; (ii)
that Plumb's Motion to Amend Order was not in conformity with Rule
9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (iii) that Plumb's Motion
to Amend Order was not proper under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; and (iv) that the May 14, 1996 Order amounts to an
impermissible taking without due process of law. Only the first of
these five arguments warrants analysis by this Court. Accordingly,
Plumb will first dispose of the four frivolous claims prior to
addressing the question of whether the Stipulation between the
parties was ambiguous.
A.

Vonwald's Claim That Plumb's Motion to Amend Order Failed
to Conform With Rule 9 (b) Was Not Properly Preserved, And
Therefore Was Waived on Appeal.
In Vonwald's Brief of the Appellant, Vonwald seems to

claim that Plumb's Motion to Amend Order was insufficient as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Brief of Appellant at 9-10) . However, Vonwald made no such objection to Plumb's Motion to Amend Order prior to the hearing on
Plumb's motion.

PLUMB2.BRF (AN)

Indeed, Vonwald did not raise the alleged Rule 9
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violation in Vonwald's Objection to Motion to Amend Order (R. 42738) or at the hearing on the matter. Instead, Vonwald first raised
the alleged Rule 9 violation in Vonwald's Objection to Proposed
Order filed after the hearing on the matter (R. 444-50).

Vonwald

waived any claim for an alleged Rule 9 violation by failing to
properly raise the claim before the trial court prior to the hearing on the matter; and this Court should now abstain from addressing this claim due to Vonwald's failure to properly raise it.
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (argument
offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not
raised below).
Moreover, the evidence presented to the trial court was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9.

Plumb did state

the circumstances constituting the mistake in the Affidavit of
Dennis K. Poole dated January 26, 1996 which was filed contemporaneously with Plumb's Motion to Amend Order (R. 408-13). This affidavit amply set forth the circumstances constituting the mistake
for which Plumb sought reformation of the Order.

Clearly, there

was no violation of Rule 9 in Plumb's Motion to Amend Order.
Vonwald's claim to the contrary is entirely meritless.1

1

Vonwald's brief also failed to set forth any authority for
the proposition that Rule 9 has any application whatsoever to a
motion brought pursuant to Rule 60 to amend an order.
PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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B.

Vonwald's Brief on Appeal Fails to Adequately
Articulate a Rule 60(b) Violation, and Should
be Disregarded by this Court.
One can surmise, based upon Paragraph C of Vonwald's Sum-

mary of the Argument, that Vonwald intended, on appeal, to raise as
an issue that Plumb's Motion to Amend Order did not comply with
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Brief of Appellant
at 10). 2

However, in the argument section of Vonwald's brief,

Vonwald failed to cite to where, in the record, this issue had been
preserved for appeal. Moreover, Vonwald did not even mention this
issue in the Argument and Authority section of Vonwald's brief
(Brief of Appellant at 10-15).

Where Vonwald (i) set forth no

legal analysis of this claim, (ii) has not set forth how Plumb
failed to comply with Rule 60(b), (iii) failed to marshal any evidence, and (iv) failed to cite to the record, this Court should
decline to consider the merits of Vonwald's claim.

Phillips v.

Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah App. 1995); see also Koulis v.
Standard Oil of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah App. 1987) (refusing
to consider brief that failed to contain record citations and that
did not conform to Rule 24 requirements for argument section of
brief); First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah
1993) (refusing to address contention in brief that did not conform
to requirements of Rule 24(a)(9)); Steele v. Board of Review, 845

2

Vonwald lists the following argument in his Summary of
Arguments:
"A motion for relief under URCiP 60(b) to be valid
requires a showing of exceptional circumstances and cannot be used
to relieve a litigant or his counsel from the consequences of his
decisions." (Brief of Appellant at 10).
PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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P.2d 960, 961-962 (Utah App. 1993) (striking brief which did not
comply with requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) and 24(a)(9)).
C.

Vonwald's Due Process and Judicial Estoppel
Claims Should Likewise be Disregarded by This
Court.
Vonwald's appellate brief also sets forth claims that (i)

the Court's amendment of its prior order constitutes a "taking"
without due process of law; and (ii) the principle of judicial
estoppel prevented Plumb's requested relief (Brief of Appellant at
10-15) . Again, Vonwald has completely failed to cite to the record
to demonstrate that either of these claims had been properly preserved for trial.

Moreover, Vonwald's legal analysis of these

claims is sorely lacking.

For instance, with regard to Vonwald's

due process claim, Vonwald fails to cite to a single case to support his contention, and in fact, acknowledges that fl[t]here probably is no precedent declaring the rights and liabilities of the
parties under such circumstances."

(Brief of Appellant at 12-13).

As for Vonwald's judicial estoppel claim, Vonwald has
failed to provide any legal analysis or argument (Brief of Appellant at 15). Clearly Vonwald's appellate brief fails to comport
with the requirements of Rule 24(a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.3 As such, this Court should decline to address the
3

Rule 24(a)(9) states: "The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. U.R.App.P. 24(a) (9)
(1996) .
PLUMB2 BRF (AN)
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issues of due process and judicial estoppel and "assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment below.11

Barney v. Utah

Dept. of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809, 810 (Utah App. 1994).
D.

Vonwald's Challenge to the Reasonableness of
Plumb's Attorney's Fees Constitutes Bad Faith
and Should be Disregarded by This Court.
Although not specifically designated as an issue on

appeal, Vonwald begins the Argument Section of his appellate brief
with a challenge to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees
claimed by Plumb in defending against Vonwald's first appeal (Brief
of Appellant at 10-12).

The reasonableness of the attorney's fees

claimed by Plumb was never at issue before the trial court.

In

fact, as set forth in the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole (R. 408-13) ,
Vonwald and Plumb came to an agreement regarding the attorney's
fees claimed by Plumb (R. 410). Vonwald's acceptance of Plumb's
attorney's fees on appeal is also reflected in the Stipulation
itself (R.348-49).
It is disingenuous at best for Vonwald to now challenge
the reasonableness of Plumb's attorney's fees on appeal when
Vonwald never raised the issue of reasonableness below but rather
agreed and stipulated to payment of such fees.

Vonwald's conduct

in bringing this meritless claim is consistent with Vonwald's
efforts, all along, to stall and avoid paying his obligation in
this matter.
This conduct moreover constitutes a violation of Rules 33
and 40(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PLUMB2 BRF (AN)
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Vonwald and

his attorney should be sanctioned pursuant to Rules 33 and 40(b)
for needlessly adding to the cost of this litigation by offering
spurious claims as grounds for their appeal. Vonwald's appeal is
frivolous and "not warranted in law".

As damages under Rule 33,

Plumb is "entitled to an award of double costs and reasonable
compensation and labor [he has] expended defending against the
appeal",

DeBry v Cascade Enterprises, 310 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9

(Utah, filed Feb. 7, 1997) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, Plumb

requests that this Court sanction Vonwald and his attorney by
imposing a fine including Plumb's attorney's fees incurred in
defending against this appeal.
E.

The Trial Court Correctly
Motion to Amend Order.

Granted

Plumb's

The only argument contained in Vonwald's appellate brief
which has been properly preserved and raised before this Court is
his claim that the Stipulation was unambiguous (Brief of Appellant
at 9, 13-14) . However, even this claim lacks merit. Plumb brought
his Motion to Amend Order on three grounds:

(i) lack of consider-

ation for a release of the June 1994 Judgment (R. 402-03); (ii)
ambiguity in the language of the Stipulation (R. 403); and (iii)
mistake of fact (R. 403-05).

The trial court's final Order of May

14, 1996 clearly set forth that Plumb was entitled to an amendment
to the January 2, 1996 Order based upon both (i) the ambiguity in
the language of the Stipulation; and (ii) mistake of fact (R. 470) .
Vonwald has completely failed to raise and address the grounds of

PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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mistake of fact which also supported the trial court's May 14, 1996
Order.
With regard to the issue of ambiguity, the ambiguity
arose in conflicting language contained in the Stipulation of the
parties dated January 2, 1996 (R. 348-49).

Paragraph 1 of the

Stipulation states:
1.
That Defendant has filed a Motion for
Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and
Costs which is pending before this Court.
(R. 348) . This paragraph clearly refers to the motion by Plumb for
and award of the additional attorney's fees he incurred in defending against Vonwald's first appeal. The Stipulation makes no mention of Plumb's prior judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of
$4,067.90 incurred prior to the appeal. Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation then reads:
4.
Upon the receipt of funds by Defendant's
counsel as specified herein, Plaintiff shall be deemed to
have satisfied all obligations in favor of the Defendant
and the Order of the Court shall reflect the same.
(R. 349) .

The ambiguity arises when these paragraphs are read

together.

Since the Stipulation clearly addressed only the issue

of Plumb's attorney's fees on appeal, did paragraph 4 of the
Stipulation also only refer to Vonwald's (Plaintiff's) obligation
for the attorney's fees incurred on appeal?
The effect of the January 2, 1996 Order was to award
Plumb a judgment of $5,315.44 for Plumb's attorney's fees on appeal
(apart from his attorney's fees below).

It was therefore logical

and appropriate that Vonwald should have been required to provide

PLUMB2 BRF (AN)
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a satisfaction of judgment for the amount of attorney's fees on
appeal upon receipt of the same; then and only then would there be
evidence of satisfaction of the Court's order.
To resolve the ambiguity in the language of the Stipulation, the trial court properly looked at the intent of the parties
in entering into the Stipulation.

"[W]hen a contract provision is

ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies, extrinsic evidence is admissible to
explain the intent of the parties.fl Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v.
Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995); Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
In support of Plumb's Motion to Amend Order, Plumb presented the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated January 26, 1996
wherein evidence was presented
Plumb's motion (R. 408-13).

to the trial court supporting

This evidence went wholly undisputed

by Vonwald before the trial court!

Since the undisputed evidence

presented to the trial court clearly supported Plumb's motion, the
trial court did not err in granting the same. Therefore, where the
extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties supported
Plumb's motion to amend, the trial court's Order dated May 14, 1996
should be upheld by this Court.

Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770;

see also Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994).
Vonwald's attack on the issue of whether an ambiguity
existed in the Stipulation ignores the other grounds for which the
trial court amended the prior Order:
PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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mistake of fact.

The

Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated January 26, 1996 also presented
evidence to support Plumb's claim for mistake of fact (R. 408-13) .
Moreover, Plumb argued, in his Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Amend Order, that the January 1996 Order was the product
of either a mutual mistake of fact or a unilateral mistake of fact
known to Vonwald (R. 403-05).

This mistake of fact went unchal-

lenged by Vonwald both before the trial court and on appeal.
Since Vonwald has not raised as an issue of appeal the
question of whether the trial court correctly amended the January
1996 Order on the basis of mistake of fact, this Court must assume
the correctness of the trial court's ruling.

Moreover, since the

trial court had an independent basis for granting Plumb's Motion to
Amend Order--mistake of fact--the correctness of the trial court's
ruling with regard to the issue of ambiguity is largely moot.
Plumb was entitled to reformation of the January 1996 Order based
upon mistake of fact.

Accordingly, even if this Court determines

that the trial court incorrectly determined there to be an ambiguity in the Stipulation as a matter of law, this Court should nonetheless affirm the trial court's May 14, 1996 Order on the basis of
mistake of fact.
II.

APPELLEE PLUMB IS ENTITLED TO AN
AWARD
OF HIS ATTORNEY'S
FEES
INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS
APPEAL.

Plumb requests an award of attorneys fees in defending
this appeal. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement signed between the
parties allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees as follows:
PLUMB2 BRF (AN)
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Both parties agree that should either party default in
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or
otherwise.
(R. 42)

Plumb incurred attorneys fees in defending Vonwald's Com-

plaint. Based upon Section N of the Agreement, the District Court
granted Plumb an award of attorneys fees in its Order dated June 8,
1994 (R. 229-32).

Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals granted

Plumb his attorney's fees on Vonwald's first appeal (R. 283-84).
This Court has recognized "that a contractual obligation
to pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should also
include fees incurred on appeal.11 Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d
890, 896 (Utah 1996) . Moreover, "the prevailing party in a dispute
over a contractual attorney fees provision [is] entitled, not only
to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled to
be indemnified."

Salmon, 916 P.2d at 895; James Constructors v.

Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Just as

Plumb was entitled to his attorney's fees for the first appeal, he
is likewise entitled to his attorney's fees in defending against
this appeal.
Plumb is further entitled to an award of attorney's fees
based upon Vonwald's violations of Rules 33(b) and 40 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

As deficient and spurious as

Vonwald's brief is, Plumb has been required nonetheless to undergo

PLUMB2.BRF (AN)
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the expense of answering it. Accordingly, Plumb also requests an
award of double attorney's fees on this appeal pursuant to Rule
33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and requests that
this court remand the issue of Plumb's attorney's fees on this
appeal to the trial court for determination.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellee Plumb respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's Order
dated May 14, 1996 and award Plumb his attorney's fees incurred in
defending against this appeal.
DATED this sp^7

<^ay of^F^ruary, 19j^

DENNIS K. POOLE
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Kevin Plumb

PLUMB2 BRF (AN)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing Brief of Appellee in Appeal No. 960254 were
mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, the ^ 7
February, 1997, to the following:
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
—
265 East 100 South, jfuite^OO
Salt Lake City, Utah\8411l\
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ADDENDUM
1.

Order dated June 8, 1994 (R. 229-31)

2.

Memorandum Decision dated May 25, 1995 (R. 287-88)

3.

Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs
dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 289-291)

4.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 292-295)

5.

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for
Attorney's Fees and Costs dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 296-302)

6.

Motion for Release of Cash Bond dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 303-04)

7.

Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated Aug. 1, 1995 (R. 305-07)

8.

Stipulation for Release of Cash Bond dated January 2, 1996 (R.
348-49)

9.

Order for Release of Cash Bond dated January 2, 1996 (R. 35051)

10.

Motion to Amend Order (R. 394-96)

11.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Full
Satisfaction and to Stay Execution and in Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Order (R. 397-407)

12.

Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated Jan. 26, 1996 (R. 408-13)

13.

Minute Entry dated April 1, 1996 (R. 443)

14.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed
Order dated April 13, 1996 (R. 451-456)

15.

Order dated April 24, 1996 (R. 460-64)

16.

Order for Supersedeas Bond and Stay of Proceedings dated Sept.
18, 1996

17.

Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

18.

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

19.

Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

PLUMB2.BRF (AN)

20

20.

Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

21.

Rule 40, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

22.

Section 78-2-2 (3) (j), Utah Code Ann. (1996)
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DENNIS K. POOLE
[2625]
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
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//

SALT L/VKZ' OOijh

'"/

By

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

CASE NO. 930905795

KEVIN PLUMB,
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Defendant.
PLAINTIFFfS OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEYS FEES having
come on for hearing before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on the
26th day of May, 1994, and the Defendant appearing by and through
his attorney Dennis K. Poole and the Plaintiff neither appearing
in person or by counsel, and the Court having considered the
affidavits, pleadings and objections for and against an award of
such fees, including an objection filed by Plaintiff immediately
prior to said hearing, and the court having taken the sworn
testimony of Dennis K. Poole and having considered the same, and
now desiring to enter an Order with respect to attorney's fees and
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard on the 24th
day of March, 1994, and the Court having determined that there are
no genuine issues of material fact,

00229

ENTERS THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS, ORDERS AND JUDGMENT:
1.

Paragraph 7 of the Earnest Money Agreement is clear and

unambiguous

and

contains

conditions

precedent

which

were

not

fulfilled, rendering closing of the contract unenforceable.
2.
entitled

Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Kevin Plumb is
to

Summary

Judgment

against

the

Plaintiff

Larry

R.

Vonwald, requiring the return by the Broker of the Earnest Money
Deposit in the sum of $5,000 made by said Defendant pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the Earnest Money Agreement dated August
10, 1993.
3.

Defendant is entitled to a judgment for its attorney's

fees and costs as follows:
Fees

Dennis K, Poole

October, 1993
November, 1993
December, 1993
January, 1994
February, 1994
March, 1994
April & May, 1994

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

TOTAL ATTORNEYS 1 FEES:

Andrea Nuffer

120.00
315.00
-0300.00
225.00
525.00
Combined:

$
$
$
$
$
$

-0207.00
828.00
360.00
261.00
310.00

$450.00

$3,901.00

Costs:
Filing fee - Crossclaim
Datashare Computer Research
TOTAL COSTS

$ 60.00
$103.90
$163.90

Such costs and fees are determined to be reasonable and necessary.

00230

4.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to

the allegations of fraud asserted by the Plaintiff are treated as
a motion for dismissal and the same is hereby granted as a result
of the Plaintiff's failure to plead the same with particularity.
5.

Plaintiff's Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

to

dismiss

Defendant's claims and for attorney's fees is denied as a result
of the orders and judgments in favor of the Defendant as set forth
above.
6.

It is further ordered that the judgment in favor of

Plaintiff shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution
or otherwise, as shall be established by affidavit.
7.

The total judgment of $4,064.90 against the Plaintiff

shall hereafter bear interest at the rate of 5.61% per annum until
p a i d

-

* * &

ORDER AND JUDGMENT dated this £/

day of June, 1994.

BY THE CC

GLENN K. I W A S A K I /
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

plumb3.ord

(sch dir)
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER in Civil No. 930905795 to the
following:
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se
2535 East Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
thisfrxfoltil

day of June, 1994.

Susan C. Held

00232

FILED
MAY 2 51995
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Larry N. Vonwald,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 940731-CA

Kevin Plumb,
Defendant and Appellee.

F I L E D
(May 25, 1995)

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Attorneys:, Larry L. Whyte, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Dennis K. Poole and Andrea Nuffer, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Larry R. Vonwald appeals the trial court's grant of Kevin
Plumb's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.1
Both parties contend that the language contained in
paragraph 7 of their Earnest Money Sales Agreement is
unambiguous. We agree that the language is unambiguous and
conclude that it creates a condition precedent which failed due
to Plumb's inability to gain county approval of his plans.
We have reviewed Vonwald's claims that Plumb breached a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, committed fraud, and
violated Rule 11. We find these claims to be without merit. See
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating court
may decline to address arguments without merit on appeal).

1. We have determined that M[t]he facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah
R. App. P. 2 9(a) (3) .

*<tW

A contractual provision for payment of attorney fees
includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal
as well as at trial. Management Servs. Corp. v. Development
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). Inasmuch as Plumb
prevailed, we remand to the district court for determination of
attorney fees to be awarded to Plumb on appeal.

Norman H. Jacksoai, Judge
i, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, dc
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and corred
copy of an original document on file in the Utah Court oi
Appeals. In testjmony whereof, I have set my hand and
affixed the seal''" ~

WE CONCUR:

AJ

^I.^IM^V

Marilyn IM. Branch
Clerk^f the Court
By^Y^.fr/7^ ,
Deputy Clerk
->-rJi,-<if
James/2/ Davis,
Associate Presiding

940731-CA

Date
Judge
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,
-vsKEVIN PLUMB,
Defendant.
Comes now

:

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

:
:

CIVIL NO. 930905795

:

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

:

the Defendant and pursuant

to the Memorandum

Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Remittitur by the
Utah Court of Appeals, respectfully moves this Court for Judgment
against the Plaintiff for:

(i) Defendant's attorney's fees on

appeal; (ii) for Defendant's costs incurred in connection with the
appeal; and (iii) Defendant's attorney's fees in bringing this
Motion.

plumvon tn4 i

This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Dennis K.

(d>p)

0*0-0'?. ^

Poole in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted concurrently herewith.
DATED this

day of August/\199 5 .

J&'Tl'YU o

ff

DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant

plumvon m4i
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR JUDGMENT in Case No.
930905795 to the following:
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se
2535 East Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this

Lot
day of August, 199 5.

/

V

//.M?\

S u s a n C. H e l d
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third J^^'^ip' restrict

DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

AUG 0 3 1995
By A

%r.ii[C>'-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

-vsCIVIL NO. 930905795
KEVIN PLUMB,
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Defendant.

Defendant respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs based
upon the Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, and the
Earnest Money Agreement which is the subject of this action.
FACTS
This matter came before this Court (the Honorable Glenn K.
Iwasaki) for hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on
the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter on Defendant's Motion
for Attorney's Fees.

The Court granted Defendant's Motion for

Summary

Judgment

dismissing

Plaintiff's

Defendant attorney's fees and costs.
a Notice of Appeal

claims

and

awarding

Plaintiff subsequently filed

from the Judgment and Order of

this Court

regarding said Motions.
On May 25, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum
Decision
respect

affirming

the

Judgment

and Order

of

this Court

to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

with

The Court of

Appeals, in its Memorandum Decision, also found that Defendant and
Appellee was entitled to attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the matter to this Court
for consideration of an award of such fees and costs and a Remittitur was filed on July 20, 1995.
ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals of Utah, in the case of Leon H. Saunders,
et al vs John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp, upon remand by the
Utah Supreme Court, states as follows:
While courts may, in some situations, award attorney
fees on an equitable basis, "attorneys fees, when awarded
as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of legal
right."
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah
1985).
One such instance occurs when the right is contractual. In such cases, "'the court does not possess the
same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it
has when fashioning equitable remedies, or applying a
statute which allows the discretionary award of such
fees.'" Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App.
1989) (quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216,
226 (5th Cir. 1975)) .
plumvon n«it

(dVp)

2

•O'O-C'2-9 3

Thus, "provisions in written contracts providing for
payment of attorney fees should ordinarily be honored by
the courts." Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080,
1085 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah
1989) (quoting Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah
1983)). . . .
Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Defendant,

therefore, is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney's fees,
legal expenses and costs incurred in connection with the appeal and
in bringing the current Motion.

Accordingly, Defendant requests

that this Court enter judgment in favor of Defendant in the amount
of these fees and costs as more particularly set forth in the
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's
Fees and Costs filed simultaneously herewith.
the right

to supplement his request

Defendant reserves

for fees and costs for

additional costs incurred in pursuing the current Motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests
that this Court grant Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment for
Attorney's Fees and Costs.
DATED this

/

day of August, 199 5.

^7?><?

DENNIS K. POOLE
ANDREA NUFFER
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C,
Attorneys for Defendant

plunivnn .twm
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS in Case No.
930905795 to the following:
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se
2535 East Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
and by depositing

the same, sealed, with first-class postage

prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this LOZ.

day of August, 1995

(//&?/? \

S u s a n C. Held

plumvon .mwi
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 930905795

-vs-

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

KEVIN PLUMB,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DENNIS K. POOLE, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice law in

the State of Utah, and represent the Defendant with respect to the
above entitled action.
2.

I am familiar with collection procedures, cases and law

generally in the State of Utah and am familiar with the papers and
pleadings filed in the above-entitled action.

plumvon.fal
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3.

Summary Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant in

this matter, in part awarding Defendant his attorney's fees and
costs incurred in this matter.

Plaintiff appealed the order and

judgment.
4.

On May 25, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its

Memorandum Opinion affirming the grant of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and a Remittitur was filed on June 20, 1995.
5.

In addition, the Appeals Court found that Defendant was

entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred by Defendant on
appeal.
6.

The following is a summary of the services, attorney's

fees, and time spent by Defendant's counsel in connection with
collection efforts, the Appeal and this Motion:
DATE
July 1994

DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES

AMOUNT

Telephone conferences with clients
re: notice of appeal and draft letter; research re: motor vehicles,
business
filings,
UCC
filings,
corporate interests and real property interests of Plaintiff for execution; review notice from Supreme
Court, prepare application for and
garnishments and related pleadings.
DKP
.5 hours
EC (paralegal) 16.8 hours
$

August 19 94

p'u"Min I af

(dkp)

Review Docketing Statement and review
of
Rules
for
Summary
Disposition.
Review Vonwald's Motion for Summary Disposition and

915.00

rules; research regarding reply to
Motion
for
Summary Disposition;
draft and edit reply to Motion for
Summary
Disposition;
conf. with
Constable re: execution sale; draft
letter to Plaintiff re: posting of
bond and stay of execution; conf.
with Judge re: setting bond on appeal
DKP
EC (paralegal)
AN (associate)

2.4 hours
1.1 hours
7.8 hours
1,117.00

October 1994

Review trial transcript and appellate brief
AN (associate)

1.05 hours
115.50

November 1994

Obtain and review record; draft
appellate brief, deliver to printer
and return record to District Court
DKP
EC (paralegal)
AN (associate)

.8 hours
2.0 hours
8.9 hours
1,207.00

December 1994

Review notice from court of Appeals
and rules of appellate procedure,
review notice of pour over from
Supreme Court, review reply brief.
DKP
AN (associate)

.6 hours
.05 hours
101.50

May 199 5

Review decision from Court of Appeals, draft letter to client
DKP

. 3 hours
48.00

pluimon faf
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June 199 5

Review Petition for Rehearing, rules
of Appellate procedure, draft letter
to client
DKP
AN (associate)

.4 hours
.2 hours
86.00

July 1995

Review Remittitur and Draft Motion
for attorney's fees and costs, draft
Affidavit
and Memorandum;
draft
Motion for Release of Bond
DKP

3.0 hours
480.00

August 1995

Estimated for review of responsive
Memo and attendance at hearing and
preparation of Order
DKP

2.0 hours
320.00

TOTAL FEES

$

4,39 0.00

The following is a breakdown of the time spent by the indivi
dual members of the firm with their hourly billing rates:
Dennis K. Poole, Senior Partner, 2.90 hrs
@ $150.00 per hour
7.10 hrs @ $160.00 per hour
Andrea Nuffer, Associate Attorney, 7.80
hrs @ $90.00 per hour
10.20 hrs @ $110.00 per hour
Elaine Colby, Paralegal, 19.90 hrs @ $50.00
per hour
Total Fees

plimivon.faf

$
435.00
$ 1,136.00
702.00
1,122.00
995.00
$ 4,390.00

(dXp)

•ft.-(lfi*>S-G

7.

The fees charged are reasonable and are comparable to the

hourly rates charged by other law firms in the area for the same
type of services.
8.

The following is an itemization of the costs expended in

collection efforts and on the Appeal:
Collection:
7/28/94

Garnishee Fee

7/28/94

Filing Fee for Garnishment and Exec

8/22/94

Motor Vehicle Search Cost

10/19/94

Compute research (county records)

TOTAL COLLECTION COSTS TO DATE

$

10.00
10.00
2.00
85.87

$ 107.87

Appeal:
8/18/94

Copy costs for Transcript

22.25

11/14/94

Copy costs of briefs

97.08

TOTAL COSTS ON APPEAL
9.

$ 119.33

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees

and costs itemized above pursuant to the Earnest Money Receipt upon
///
///
///
///

plumvon f»f
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which this action is based and the Memorandum Decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1995

'' "7>^L.

DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
.

ACKNOWLEDGED before me this
DENNIS K. POOLE.
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• / -

day of August, 19 9 5 by

C^a'c~t.*\
NOTARY PUBLIC / /
Residing in Sait Lake, Utah
My Commission Expires:
i Jti^Sth*.
Notary Public ~" *~ **
I ^ S f t t t S l k _5 4 ELAINE COLBY
|
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k e C j t700
U t aEast
h

i til (TOOTf M S*
*
34107 !
! y&JK&ttJjff My Commission Expires 1
'

NSW2^

l~*Tt2?zC«.*-

plumvon.frtf

Ww*

26. 199»

I

Stat&ofUtah

•

(dkp)

A A A 9 A 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS in Case No.
930905795 to the following:
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se
2535 East Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this /y~t

day of August, 1995

Susan C. Held

plutm'on.faf

(dkp)

A A {i O A *">

\t v 0 o i) /:

niH> OISITR^COURT

AUG 0 3 1995
DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION FOR RELEASE OF
CASH BOND

LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

CIVIL NO. 930905795
KEVIN PLUMB,
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Defendant.
THE DEFENDANT KEVIN PLUMB, by and through his attorney Dennis
K. Poole, respectfully moves the Court for an order releasing the
Plaintiff's cash supersedeas bond in the sum of $5,500.

This

Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole filed
contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this

tit.,

day of August 199 5

c£<n-

DENNIS K. POOLE
ANDREA NUFFER
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RELEASE OF CASH BOND in
Case No. 930905795 to the following:
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se
2535 East Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
and by depositing

the same, sealed, with first-class postage

prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
Lot.

this

day of August, 199 5.

Y/.M)\
Susan C. Held'
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,

:

Plaintiff,

:

-vsKEVIN PLUMB,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF
DENNIS K. POOLE

:

CIVIL NO. 930905795

:

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

:

)
:

SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DENNIS K. POOLE, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the Defendant in the above-entitled

action.
2.

Defendant prevailed on a Motion for Summary Judgment on

the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter was awarded attorney's
fees.

p]umvon.nC(

(dVp)

3.

The Plaintiff in the above-entitled action filed a Notice

of Appeal from the Judgment and Order of this Court.
4.

On the 30th day of August, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K.

Iwasaki entered an order approving a cash supersedeas bond in the
sum of $5,500, which bond in whole or in part has been tendered and
posted by the Plaintiff.
5.

On May

25, 1995, the Court

of Appeals

issued

its

memorandum decision affirming the Judgment and Order in favor of
the Defendant and further found that the Defendant was entitled to
his attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
6.

The Defendant has also incurred attorney's fees and costs

relative to its attempts to collect the Judgment which are more
particularly set forth in an Affidavit of Affiant in support of
Motion for Attorney's Fees filed contemporaneously herewith.
7.

Defendant Kevin Plumb has not collected any sums or

amounts due upon the Judgment and is entitled to an order of the
///
///
///
///
///
///

p l u m v n n .r»t •
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Court releasing the cash bond to him for application against the
Judgment and amounts due him.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1995.

-&?n<~> /'

^

DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ACKNOWLEDGED before me this A /
day of August, 19 9 5 by
DENNIS K. POOLE.
'
,,'
NOTARY PUBLIC
~7
Residing in Salt Lake, Utah
My Commission Expires:

T

Notary Public
=LAIM* C
CO!
ELAIM5
O t ^?•YV
4543 Sou:', /
" - , t ?;"?)
Sc!t U k c 0.
:..:107
My Cr-mm:^;:.-: .;;-.piro3
March 23, 1a 33
State of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS K. POOLE in Case
No. 930905795 to the following:
Larry R. Vonwald, Pro Se
2535 East Chalet Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
and by depositing

the same, sealed, with first-class postage

prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this Jyvt

Susan^C. Held

plitmvnn.nff
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day of August, 1995.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN - 2 1996
DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

_

;

SALT LAKE COUNlYy/
DEPUTY CLEBy

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

:

STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF
CASH BOND

t
:
CIVIL NO. 930905795

KEVIN PLUMB,

:
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.

:

THE DEFENDANT KEVIN PLUMB, by and through his attorney Dennis
K. Poole, and the PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his
attorney Larry L. Whyte, respectfully stipulate and agree as
follows:
1.

That Defendant has filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment

for Attorney's Fees and Costs which is pending before this Court.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant desire to resolve such Motion and

all remaining issues between them in accordance with the terms of
this Stipulation.

plumvon.stp
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3.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

stipulate

and

agree

that

Plaintiff's cash supersedeas bond in the sum of $5,500 shall be
released by the Clerk of the Court to be disbursed as follows:
(a)
attorney

The sum of $5,315.44 shall be paid to Dennis K. Poole,
for

the Defendant,

for

the benefit

of Defendant

and

counsel.
(b)

The sum of $184.56 shall be disbursed to Plaintiff.

4.

Upon

the receipt

of funds by Defendant's

counsel as

specified herein, Plaintiff shall be deemed to have satisfied all
obligations in favor of the Defendant and the Order of the Court
shall reflect the same.
5.

Upon receipt of

such funds, Defendant

shall cause a

Satisfaction of Judgment to be filed with the Court.
DATED this *l&&

day

of

i^eeeS^^ 1995,

//'*tst^->

DENNIS K. POOLE
ANDREA NUFFER
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys^ or Defendant

LARRY L. WHY1>£
Attorney for Plaintiff
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone:
(801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

J A N - 2 1996
SALTLAKECOUNTY
DEPUTY CLERK

j
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,

:

Plaintiff,

ORDER FOR RELEASE OF
CASH BOND

:

-vs-

:
CIVIL NO. 930905795

KEVIN PLUMB,

:
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.

:

THE DEFENDANT KEVIN PLUMB, by and through his attorney Dennis
K. Poole, and the PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his
attorney Larry L. Whyte, having stipulated to the release of Cash
Bond and for disbursement thereof, and for good cause appearing
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case bond of the Plaintiff in
the sum of

$5,500 be disbursed by

the Clerk

of

the Court

as

follows:
(a)
attorney

The sum of $5,315.44 shall be paid to Dennis K. Poole,
for

the Defendant,

for the benefit

of Defendant

and

counsel.
(b)

The sum of $184.56 shall be disbursed to Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED

that upon receipt of funds by

the

Defendant, Defendant shall file with the Court a satisfaction of
Judgment.

9W5'A

ORDER dated this^^

day of

JUDGE GLENN K
Approved as to Form:

J=±

Larry L. WHyte, Esq.
Attorney for the Plai

A toasts*

DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone (801) 263-3344
Telecopier (801) 263-1010
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 930905795

vs •
KEVIN PLUMB,

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Defendant.

Defendant, Kevin Plumb,,by and through his attorney Dennis K.
Poole, pursuant to Rule 60 and/or the equitable powers of this
Court, respectfully requests of the Court as follows:
1.

Should the Court determine that an Order of the Court

dated January 2, 199 6, is ambiguous, for an order amending the same
to require a satisfaction of the amounts paid as recited in such
Order only.
2.

For an order amending that certain Stipulation dated the

2nd day of January, 1996, as the result of a mutual mistake of fact
or a unilateral mistake of fact,which is known, or should have been
known, by the Plaintiff.

OfrOSSi

3.

In the event that an ambiguity exists and reformation is

not ordered, for an order of the Court vacating such Stipulation
and Order based upon mutual mistake of fact or unilateral mistake
known to the Plaintiff.
This Motion is supported by Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction and to Stay Execution and in Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Order filed
contemporaneously herewith.

This Motion is also supported by the

Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole filejd-^Gontemporaneously herewith.

DENNIS K. P O O L E "
^
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Motion to Amend Order in Case No. 930905795 was mailed,
United States Mail, postage prepaid, the 3a

day of January, 199 6,

to the following:
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
265 East 100 South, Suite
Salt Lake City, Utah 84Ml

TLUMB MOT (EO)
P0041 060M
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FULL
SATISFACTION AND TO STAY
EXECUTION AND IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND
ORDER

LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,

-vsCIVIL NO. 930905795
KEVIN PLUMB,
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Defendant.

Defendant respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction of Judgment and Motion
to Stay Execution and in support of Defendant's Motion to Amend
Order.
I. FACTS
This matter originally came before this Court (the Honorable
Glenn K. Iwasaki) for hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees.

The Court granted Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims and
awarding Defendant attorney's fees and costs of $4,064.90 (someplumjan.mcm (ilkp)
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times referred to herein as the "June Judgment"). Plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal from the Judgment and Order of
this Court regarding said Motions.
On May 25, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum
Decision affirming the Judgment and Order of this Court with respect to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

The Court of

Appeals, in its Memorandum Decision, also found that Defendant and
Appellee was entitled to attorney's fees and costs incurred on
appeal. On June 8, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Rehearing,
which Petition was later denied.

Later, on September 15, 1995

Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah
Supreme Court, which Petition was denied December 7, 199 5.
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the matter to this Court
for consideration of an award of attorney's fees and costs. Based
upon that remand, on December 12, 1995, Defendant
Motions:

filed two

(i) a Motion for Release of Cash Bond; and (ii) a Motion

for Entry of Judgment For Attorney's Fees and Costs specifically
for (a) Defendant's attorney's fees incurred on appeal, (b) Defendant's costs incurred in connection with the appeal, and (c) Defendant's attorney's fees in bringing the Motion for additional attorney's fees.

Defendant claimed costs and attorney's fees totaling

$5,475.44 on appeal. See Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole dated December 12, 1995, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff's Motion as
Exhibit "E."

phunjan m a n (dkp)
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During December, 1995, counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant
negotiated a $160.00 reduction in the amount claimed by Defendant
under the terms of the December 12, 1995 Motion and Affidavit and
thereafter entered into a Stipulation for release of a Cash Bond
for payment of the same.

Plaintiff now claims that such Stipula-

tion also requires the entry of a satisfaction for the June Judgment of $4,064,90.

Defendant disputes this claim, asserting that

it was not the intent of the parties to release the prior judgment
which remains unpaid.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

THE JANUARY 2, 1996 STIPULATION RESOLVED THE OUTSTANDING MOTIONS AND DID NOT SATISFY THE JUNE
JUDGMENT.

As the Court is aware, this matter arose out of the Plaintiff's misreading of a condition precedent contained in a Real
Estate Purchase Contract between Plaintiff as Seller and Defendant
as Buyer. As a result of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
this Court determined that the contract was not ambiguous and that
Defendant was entitled to judgment for his attorney's fees and
costs.

A judgment in the amount of $4,064.90 was entered on or

about June 9, 1994 (the "June Judgment").

Plaintiff has paid

nothing against the June Judgment.
Plaintiff chose to appeal the June Judgment to the Court of
Appeals and having lost the appeal subsequently made a Request for
Rehearing and a Petition for Certiorari.

The appellate courts

having sustained the June Judgment, on December 12, 1995, Defendant
plumjan m e m (dkp)
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filed a Motion for attorney's fees and costs incurred on the appeals to which the Court of Appeals concluded Defendant was entitled.

Defendant claimed in his Motion for Entry of Judgment for

Fees and Costs that he was entitled to a judgment of $5,475.44.
In response to the Motion, Larry Whyte called Defendant's
counsel and negotiated a reduction of $160.00 in the amount claimed
in the Motion and supporting Affidavit. Plaintiff now asserts that
he is entitled to a satisfaction of the June Judgment, although no
specific negotiations occurred with respect to satisfaction of the
prior judgment and nothing was paid against the same. The terms of
the parties' Stipulation, the Court's Order and the history of this
case do not support Plaintiff's position.
When Plaintiff filed his Motion for Entry of Judgment for
Attorney's Fees and Costs and his separate Motion for Release of
Bond, no other issues were pending before the Court. The Stipulation dated January 2, 199 6 specifically refers to the pending
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's Fees and Costs and the
parties desire to resolve such Motion and all remaining issues -clearly the Motion for Release of Bond.

The stipulation then

provided that the Clerk would disburse those funds and Defendant
would provide a satisfaction "upon receipt of such funds."

As is

evident from Mr. Whyte's own handwriting on Exhibit "E" to his
Motion, he agreed that the amount being negotiated and paid was for
fees and costs claimed in the pending Motion and supporting Affidavit (primarily fees and costs on appeal) , and had no relationship
plumjan m e m (dkp)
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to the outstanding judgment. Nowhere does the Stipulation specify
that a satisfaction was to be entered as to the June Judgment.
Plaintiff asserts in his Motion that the Defendant agreed the
payment was to satisfy all obligations, including the June Judgment.

Such an interpretation is a misreading of the Stipulation

for the following reasons.

First, such a reading is beyond the

scope of the Stipulation; by its terms it was to resolve the issue
of a claim for additional fees and costs and the pending Motion for
release of bond.

Second, the outstanding, unsatisfied June Judg-

ment was not an issue pending before the court; the claim for prior
fees and costs had already been liquidated and reduced to judgment.
Third, there is no reference within the terms of the Stipulation or
the Court's Order dated January 2, 199 6, to the prior June Judgment, only to a satisfaction related to payment of the amount to be
disbursed to Defendant.

Fourth, and most important of all, logic

does not support Defendant's compromise and satisfaction of an outstanding judgment for an amount in excess of $4,000, supported by
an opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, by the mere payment of
approximately $5,000, being the amount of the additional claim!1
Indeed, if Mr. Whyte intended to receive a satisfaction of all
claims totaling in excess

of $9,000, why did he not request the

same be specific reference to the prior judgment, especially when
he was previously advised that the amounts claimed would not be
1

plumjan mem (dkp)

See Argument that Satisfaction was without consideration.
Section B.
5

owm

compromised? Why would counsel for the Defendant agree to the payment of only the additional fees and costs on appeal and waive the
amounts due on the June Judgment without any payment at all?
Clearly, Plaintiff's request was not within the contemplation of
either party and Plaintiff is merely looking for language to support the avoidance of a just debt and obligation.
B.

THERE IS NO CONSIDERATION FOR RELEASE OF THE JUNE,
19 9 4 JUDGMENT.

Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to a release of the June
Judgment by the parties' Stipulation to satisfy the outstanding
claims for attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Yet it is apparent
from Mr. Whyte's own handwritten notes on Exhibit "E" that the
amount compromised and to be paid related solely to the pending
Motion for Entry of Judgment For Attorney's Fees and Costs.
Page 5 of the Exhibit.)

(See

Absolutely nothing was allocated by Mr.

Whyte to the prior June Judgment. Consequently, Plaintiff is asking for the release of a prior judgment when admittedly nothing has
been paid against it.
As before, Plaintiff is asking the Court to interpret language
of a document, in this Case a Stipulation, without consideration of
the total facts, events and circumstances before the parties and
the requirement that consideration be paid for satisfaction of the
June Judgment.

Davis v. Barrett, 467 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1970)

("it is horn book law that a release is not supported by sufficient
consideration unless something of value was received to which the
creditor had no previous right."). Because the requested satisfacplumjan.mem (dkp)
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tion of the June Judgment is without any consideration, Plaintiff
is not entitled to a satisfaction.
C

IF AN AMBIGUITY EXISTS, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN
ORDER OF THE COURT AMENDING THE JANUARY 2, 199 6
ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 60.

If any ambiguity exists as to the January 2, 199 6 Order and
the required issuance of a Satisfaction of Judgment, Defendant is
entitled to an Order pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure amending the January Order. The effect of the January 2,
1996 Order was to award Plaintiff a judgment of $5,315.44.

It was

therefore logical and appropriate that Defendant be required to
provide a satisfaction of judgment for such amount upon receipt of
the same; then and only then would there be evidence of satisfaction of the Court's order.

The Order so states:

"[Ujpon receipt

of funds by the Defendant, Defendant shall file with the Court a
satisfaction of Judgment."
If, because of clerical error, there is an ambiguity that
Defendant was to issue a satisfaction as to the January 2, 1996
Order only, the Court has the power pursuant to Rule 60 to modify
the prior order and explicitly provide for the limited satisfaction.

Clearly, equity and justice would not permit Plaintiff to

avoid his legitimate obligations by virtue of clerical error.
D.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM A MISTAKE OF
FACT.

It is apparent from the facts set forth above that Defendant
never intended to issue to Plaintiff a Satisfaction of Judgment for
the June Judgment by the mere compromise and settlement of the
plumJAtunem (dkp)

additional claims for attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

It is

also apparent that if the Court adopts Plaintiff's tortured reading
of the Stipulation and Order, Plaintiff either was a party to a
mutual mistake of fact or had knowledge of Defendant's unilateral
mistake of fact.
In order for a mutual mistake of fact to exist,
1.
The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that
to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscionable.
2.
The matter as to which the mistake was made must
relate to a material feature of the contract.
3.
Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake.
4.
It must be possible to give relief by way of rescission without serious prejudice to the other party except the
loss of his [or her] bargain. In other words, it must be possible to put him [or her] in status quo.
Mostroncr v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 580 (Utah App. 1993) (citing B
6c A Assoc, v. L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co., 796 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah
1990) ) . There is little doubt in this case that to forgive half of
Plaintiff's obligations by virtue of a mistake would be unconscionable.

Furthermore, relief

is possible; either rescission or

reformation is available to the parties, as set forth below.

The

facts also demonstrate that ordinary diligence was exercised; Defendant prepared the Stipulation and Order, copies were sent to Plaintiff 's counsel, and Plaintiff never requested any changes to the
Stipulation and Order which Plaintiff perceived to be ambiguous.

plumjan m e m (dkp)
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Even if a Mutual Mistake has not occurred, the Court is
authorized to vacate the Stipulation for a unilateral mistake by
Defendant.

In Guardian State Bank v. Stangle, 778 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah

19 89), the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
Even apart from cases involving an incorrect memorialization of an agreement, where a unilateral mistake of
fact is the basis of the parties' agreement, a court is
not always without power to afford relief. For example,
in Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co, 682
P.2d 843 (Utah 1984), we upheld the trial court's ruling
that an offeree could not rely on promissory estoppel
when the offeror made a unilateral mistake which the
offeree either knew or must have known about. [Citations
omitted. ]
Further, in Rothe v. Rothe, 787 P.2d 534 (Utah App. 1990), the
Court of Appeals concluded that " [t]he Utah Supreme Court has also
clarified that unilateral mistake in the formalization of a writing
may also provide an appropriate basis for reformation."

Id. at

Thus, in this matter, the Court can reject Plaintiff's assertion that he is entitled to a Satisfaction of the June Judgment,
reform the Stipulation to meet the intent of the parties, or as a
last resort, vacate the Stipulation between the parties and return
the parties to the status quo.
E.

DEFENDANT
FEES.

IS ENTITLED

TO ADDITIONAL

ATTORNEY'S

The June Judgment provides in Paragraph 6:
It is further ordered that the judgment in favor of
Plaintiff shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable
costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise, as shall be established by affidavit.
pluinjan.mcm (dkp)
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By virtue of the need for Defendant to defend against Plaintiff's
Motions and the filing of his own motion, Defendant has been required to incur additional attorney's fees as set forth in the
Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole. Consequently, Defendant is entitled
to a judgment for the amount of these additional attorney's fees.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests
that this Court enforce the Stipulation as intended by Defendant,
or if ambiguous reform the Stipulation, or in the alternative,
vacate the Stipulation and Order. Additionally, Defendant requests
an award of attorney's fees incurred in defending against Plaintiff's motions and in bringing DefLaiidant's motion.
DATED this ^0

day of January,

DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant

plumjan.mem (dkp)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FULL
SATISFACTION AND TO STAY EXECUTION AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER in Case No. 930905795 was mailed, United
States Mail, postage prepaid, the

3t> day of January, 1996, to the

following:
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utal
Attorney for Plainti\ff

plumjanmem (dkp)
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF
DENNIS K. POOLE
(January 26, 1996)

LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 930905795

-vsKEVIN PLUMB,

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

DENNIS K. POOLE, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for Defendant in the above-entitled

action.
2.

Defendant prevailed on a Motion for Summary Judgment on

the 24th day of March, 1994, and thereafter was awarded attorney's
fees .
3.

Plaintiff in the above-entitled action filed a Notice of

Appeal from the Judgment and Order of this Court.

PlHMVr>N2 AFF
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4.

On the 30th day of August, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K.

Iwasaki entered an order approving a cash supersedeas bond in the
sum o£ $5,500, which bond, in whole or in part, has been tendered
and posted by Plaintiff.
5.

On May 25, 199 5, the Court of Appeals issued its memoran-

dum decision affirming the Judgment and Order in favor of Defendant
and further found that Defendant was entitled to his attorney's
fees and costs incurred on appeal.
6.

On June 8, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Rehear-

ing, which Petition was later denied.
7.

On September 15, 1995 Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ

of Certiorari, which Petition was denied December 7, 1995.
8.

On December 12, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion for Release

of Cash Bond for application against the outstanding judgment and
amounts due Defendant.
9.

On December 12, 1995, Defendant also filed a Motion for

Entry of Judgment For Attorney's Fees and Costs specifically for
(i) Defendant's attorney's fees on appeal, (ii) Defendant's costs
incurred

in connection with

the appeal, and

(iii) Defendant's

attorney's fees in bringing the Motion for additional attorney's
fees.

The Motion was supported by Affidavit and Memorandum claim-

ing total costs and fees of $5,475.44.

See a true and correct copy

of the Affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
10.
Plaintiff,
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Prior to Christmas, 199 5, Larry Whyte, attorney
telephoned

Affiant

asking

2

if

the matter

could

V

V

V

for
be
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resolved at a discount. Mr. Whyte was specifically told by Affiant
that the amounts claimed would not be compromised after the long
appellate process, but that payment terms over approximately 60
days would be considered.

Mr. Whyte suggested that we should at

least resolve the pending Motion and he would get back to Affiant.
A few days later Mr. Whyte called again and requested credit upon
fees and costs claimed in the December 12, 1995 Affidavit for the
one hour that Affiant would not have to attend a hearing, if the
matter was resolved.

Affiant agreed to the reduction of $160 for

the claimed fees and that the bond would be released to pay the
amounts claimed in the Affidavit in exchange for a satisfaction of
these claims.

(See copy of Affiant's Affidavit dated December 12,

1995, provided to the Court by Mr. Whyte as Exhibit "E" to his
Motion which clearly shows on page 5 in Mr. Whyte's handwriting, a
reduction of fees attributable to the Motion by $160.00.)

There

was no discussion about a satisfaction of the prior judgment and
Affiant did not agree to release the same.
11.

The negotiated figure set forth above was solely in ref-

erence to Defendant's outstanding Motion for additional attorney's
fees and costs and had no relationship, factually or by amount, to
an

outstanding

judgment

against

Plaintiff

in

the

amount of

$4,064.90 docketed with the Court on or about June 8, 1994.

A

draft of the Stipulation and Order was forwarded to Mr. Whyte, who
made no request for changes.
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12. On January 2, 1996, Affiant obtained the signature of Mr.
Whyte upon a Stipulation for Release of Cash Bond. The Stipulation
recites that Defendant has filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment for
Attorney's Fees and Costs and that the parties desired to resolve
such Motion and the remaining issues. Since the prior judgment had
been upheld on appeal, Affiant understood that the only remaining
issue for resolution by the Court was Defendant's outstanding
Motion for Release of the Cash Bond.

Because Plaintiff and Defen-

dant were agreeing that Defendant was to have an order requiring
the payment of $5,315.44 from the Bond, Affiant believed that
Defendant was entitled to a satisfaction of judgment upon receipt
of that payment. At the time Mr. Whyte's signature was obtain, Mr.
Whyte made no mention of obtaining a satisfaction of the June 8,
1994 judgment.
13. Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, Affiant obtained an Order of the Court which provided that Defendant was to receive a disbursement of the Bond pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation and that Defendant was obligated to provide a Satisfaction
of Judgment upon receipt of the $5,315.44, clearly referring to
this current Order and disbursement and not to any prior judgment.
See a true and correct copy of the Order

[absent signatures]

attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
14.

Upon receipt of the payment of $5,315.44, Affiant filed

with the Court a Satisfaction of Judgment (Partial) clearly reserving Defendant's right to pursue the prior Judgment. See a true and

correct copy of the Satisfaction of Judgment (Partial) attached
hereto as Exhibit "CM.
15.

Defendant has incurred additional attorney's fees in re-

sponding to Plaintiff's current Motion and in Support of Defendant's own Motion and should be awarded additional fees of not less
than $1,000.00, in preparing this Affidavit and a Memorandum.
16.

Defendant Kevin Plumb has not collected any sums or

amounts due upon the June Judgment,
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

3C> day of January, 1996.

DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ACKNOWLEDGED before me th IS
DENNIS K. POOLE.

NOTARY PUBLIC
'
Residing in Salt~Lake, Utah

My Commission Expires
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Notary Public " " " " 1
ELAINE COLBY
4543 South 700 East #200 i
Salt Lake City, Utsh £54107 I
M
y Commission Expires I
March 26, 1993
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS K. POOLE in Case No. 930905795 was
mailed, United States Mail, postage prepaid, the

^^

day of

January, 1996, to the following:
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 S6utH>^Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah \ 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
VONWALD, LARRY R
PLAINTIFF

VS
PLUMB, KEVIN

CASE NUMBER 930905795 CN
DATE 04/01/96
HONORABLE GLENN K IWASAKI
COURT REPORTER TAPE
COURT CLERK JMB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

ORAL ARGUMENTS

P. ATTY. VONWALD, LARRY R
D. ATTY. POOLE, DENNIS K.

THIS CASE COMES BEFORE THE COURT ON ORAL ARGUMENTS ON
VARIOUS MOTIONS. APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE.
BASED UPON THE REPRESENTATION OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, COURT
ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:
1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION IS GRANTED;
2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FULL SATISFACTION IS DENIED;
3) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND ORDER IS GRANTED;
4) EACH SIDE TO BEAR THEIR OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES;
5) MR. POOLE IS DIRECTED TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE ORDER.

fef}ft44*
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DENNIS K. POOLE
[2625]
ANDREA NUFFER
[6623]
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION
TO PROPOSED ORDER

LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

CASE NO. 930905795
KEVIN PLUMB,
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Defendant.
The Defendant Kevin Plumb, by and through his attorney Dennis
K. Poole and pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Objection to Proposed Order.
ARGUMENT
Defendant responds to Plaintiff's Objections paragraph by
paragraph as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's objection to Paragraph 1 of the Order is

nothing more and nothing less than a re-argument of Plaintiff's
prior

assertions.

Nowhere

does

Plaintiff

Paragraph is contrary to the Court's ruling.

contend

that

the

Consequently, the

objection is inappropriate and should be stricken.
plumb.HW
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2.

Paragraph

2 of

Plaintiff's

Objection

is again a re-

argument of Plaintiff's position which has been ruled upon by the
Court.
3.

Paragraph 3 is likewise a re-argument of the case and not

an objection to the Order.

The Court has already determined that

an ambiguity existed in the prior Stipulation and Order which would
allow the admission of extrinsic evidence.
ignores

a well

established

rule

Furthermore, Plaintiff

that extrinsic

evidence maybe

admitted to establish the existence of a mutual and/or unilateral
mistake of fact.
4.

In

objecting

to

Paragraph

4 of

the proposed

Order,

Plaintiff cites Rule 9 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
alleging that averments of mistake must be set forth with particularity.

To the extent that this rule would has application for a

post-judgment motion made pursuant to Rule 60, Defendant asserts
that he set forth the alleged mistake in particularity as contained
in the affidavit of Dennis K. Poole filed in support of Defendant's
Motion to Amend.
his

Notwithstanding a sworn affidavit, Plaintiff and

counsel chose not

to contest any issue

affidavit by counter-affidavit.
the

statements

contained

contained

in that

Therefore, the Court must accept

in counsel's

affidavit

as

undisputed

facts, which with the admissions of Plaintiff's counsel at hearing,
justify the Orders of the Court.
Again,

for the most part, the objections of Plaintiff

in

reference to Paragraph 4 are a re-argument of u.2 case.
plumb.me2 l*c*\ Jir)
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5.

Plaintiff's argument to Paragraph 7 is unintelligible.

It is believed that Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Plumb's Motion
to Amend did not request a release of the funds for application
against the December Motion for Attorney's fees and costs.

Such a

request would be useless; Defendant had already received a release
of the bond pursuant to stipulation of the parties.

Defendant's

Motion to Amend requested the Court to revise the parties' Stipulation and the January Order to clarify that the Satisfaction of
Judgment to be issued was only for those funds received from the
bond funds and applied in satisfaction of Defendant's pending
Motion for Attorney's fees and costs and not as a satisfaction of
the June, 1994 Judgment.

Paragraph 7 amending the Court's January

2, 1996 Order clearly so provides.

In essence, the amendment

states that receipt of funds from the release of bond results in
satisfaction of the January 2, 1996 Order but not as a satisfaction
of the June, 1994 Judgment of $4,064.90.
Plaintiff incorrectly states that the Court set the Stipulation aside.

The Court will recall and as cited in the proposed

Order (which statement is not objected to by counsel), Mr. Whyte
was asked at the hearing if Plaintiff would rescind the parties'
settlement agreement if the January 2, 1996 Order was amended. Mr.
Whyte stated that no such rescission would be made.

Consequently,

the Court did not set aside the Stipulation but merely amended the
Stipulation and Order clarifying the ambiguity.

Thus, the amount

of attorneys fees and costs claimed by the Defei^ant, being the sum
plumb.me2 (sch dn)
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of $5,315.44, was not and is not an issue before the Court.

The

settlement and Stipulation regarding such fees and costs stands
between the parties.

Consequently, by counsel's election not to

rescind the settlement agreement, Plaintiff has waived any right to
a hearing on the prior petition by Defendant for attorneys fees and
costs incurred during the appeal of this matter.
REVISED ORDER
As result of the Plaintiff's objection and a re-reading of the
proposed Order, Defendant has proposed two grammatical revisions to
the Order which are set forth in a black-line copy attached hereto.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Objections to the proposed Order is largely an
attempt

to re-argue

the

case.

Furthermore,

Plaintiff

is now

asserting that the Stipulation was set aside by the Court, a matter
neither

ruled

upon nor

an

issue before

the Court because of

Plaintiff's waiver of the right to rescind.

Plaintiff's Objections

evidence a continued pattern of delay and irrational and illogical
interpretation of the issues and rulings of the Court. Consequently, Plaintiff's objections should be denied and Defendant should
have his attorneys fees incurred in responding to these objections
which are interposed solely for delay and harassment.

plumh.me? (srh dir)
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DATED this /S>

day of

996
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DENNIS K. POOLE
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS in case No. 930905795 to the following:
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and by deposition the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this i.rS day of April, 1996.

Amy P. HaWiay
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,

:

Plaintiff,
-vsKEVIN PLUMB,
Defendant.
Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's
Proceedings,

:

^\L\^^^[

:

CIVIL NO. 930905795

:

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

:

Motion

Motion

ORDER

to

Defendant's

for
Stay

Full

Satisfaction

Execution

Objection

and/or

of

Judgment,

Enforcement

to Plaintiff's

Motion

of
and

Defendant's Motion to Amend Order having come on for hearing before
the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on the first day of April, 1996, and
the Plaintiff being represented by his attorney Larry L. Whyte and
the Defendant being represented by his attorney Dennis K. Poole and
the Court having considered the arguments of counsel and the
Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole and Memoranda in Support and Opposi-

0 ft ft 4 f <»

tion to such Motions and the Court having further considered the
representations of Mr. Whyte that should the Court enter an Order
amending the January 2, 1996 Order of the Court that the Plaintiff
will not rescind the parties' Settlement Agreement/ 199 6 Order of
•the—Court—that—the—Plaintiff—will—ne£—rescind—the—partners
Settlement Agreement, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows:
1.

The motions pending before the Court are equitable in

nature and are intended to resolve an ambiguity which is contained
in a Stipulation of the parties and an Order of the Court dated
January 2, 1996 (the "January Order").
2.

There is no specific mention in the Stipulation or

January Order to a Judgment previously granted in this matter in
favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff in the sum of
$4,064.90 entered on/or about June 9, 1994 (the "June Judgment").
3.

From the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole on file with the

Court, and based upon the prior proceedings, it was the intent of
the Defendant, through his counsel, to resolve by Stipulation
Defendant's pending Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney's
Fees and Costs dated December 12, 1995, wherein the Defendant
claimed entitlement to attorney's fees and costs of $5,475.44
("Defendant's Fee Motion").
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4.

Upon

consideration

of

Defendant's

Fee

Motion

and

supported by the Affidavit of Dennis K. Poole, it is apparent that
a mutual mistake and/or unilateral mistake of fact which should
have been known to Plaintiff's counsel occurred in the documentation of said Stipulation and the January Order which was intended
to resolve Defendant's Fee Motion.
5.

As a result of the forgoing ambiguity and mistake of

fact, the Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction be and the same
is hereby denied,
6.

Plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Execution is now moot by

virtue of the denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Full Satisfaction.
7.

The Court's Order dated January 2, 199 6 is hereby ordered

amended to provide that upon the Defendant's receipt of the sum of
$5,315.44, a partial satisfaction of judgment shall be entered for
such amount and that the June Judgment previously entered in favor
of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, Larry R. Vonwald, in
the sum of $4,064.90 (with interest, costs and attorneys' fees as
may be provided therein), remains outstanding and unsatisfied as of
this date, together with interest and costs remains outstanding and
unsatisfied as of—this date.

The Court notes that Defendant has

already filed a partial satisfaction relative to the January 2,
199 6 Order, as amended hereby.
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8.

Based upon the forgoing, and by virtue of the equitable

nature of the proceedings before the Court, each of the parties are
to bear their own attorney's fees and costs relative to the Motions
considered by the Court ory-^xi.1

1, 199 6.

ORDERED DATED thig^^^fday of April, 1996.
the C

\

Approved as to form

LARRY L. WHYTE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER in Case No. 930905795 to the
following:
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
and by depositing

84111

the same, sealed, with first-class postage

prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City, Utah
this

/o

day of April, 1996.

Amy P. Harmay
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARRY R. VONWALD,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

:

ORDER FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND
AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

:
:
CIVIL NO. 930905795

KEVIN PLUMB,

:
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.

:

THE PLAINTIFF LARRY R. VONWALD, by and through his attorney
Larry L. Whyte having orally requested the Court to set the amount
of a cash supersedeas bond by telephonic hearing on the 19 th day of
September, 199 6, and the Defendant Kevin Plumb being represented by
his attorney Dennis K. Poole who participated in such telephonic
hearing, and the Court having heard the representations of counsel,
and for good cause appearing
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff may deposit a cash bond with the Clerk of

the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the
amount of $6,700.
2.

Conditioned upon such deposit and the presentation of

evidence of the same to Defendant's counsel, and pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Ci- 1 Procedure, all

proceedings to collect that certain Order and Judgment entered on
or about June 8, 19 94 in the principal sum of $4,064.9 0 (together
with interest and other relief as provided therein) entered in
favor or the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, including the
enforcement of executions, a sheriff's sale scheduled for this date
and continued until September 23, 1996, and any other collection

fUifl aft*
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resolving the threshold requirement of
whether appellant's circumstances had materially changed; however, it does not follow that
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial
court asked to render a judgment by default
must first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an applicant's petition are, on their
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v.
Collard, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App.
1992).
Purpose of rules.
The fundamental purpose of the liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute, subject
only to the requirement that their adversaries
have fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved. Williams v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982).
Cited in Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah
324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952); Dowse v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953);
Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 265 P.2d 383
(1953); Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311
P.2d 788 (1957); McGavin v. Preferred Ins.

Rule 9

Exch., 7 Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958);
Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah 2d 302, 343 P.2d
731 (1959); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369
P.2d 933 (1962); Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 Utah 2d
165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970); Murdock v. Blake, 26
Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971); Whitmore v.
Calavo Growers, 28 Utah 2d 165, 499 P.2d 849
(1972); Whitmore v. Industrial Comm'n, 23
Utah 2d 185, 499 P.2d 1290 (1972); Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp.,
525 P.2d 615 (Utah 1974); Midwest Realty v.
City of West Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (Utah
1975); Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah
1979); Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah
1981); Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d
1190 (Utah 1981); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982); Sears
v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982);
Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983);
Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d
1222 (Utah 1988); Sather v. Pitcher, 748 P.2d
191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Lloyd's Unlimited v.
Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins,
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah
1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 1 et seq., 59, 68 et seq., 141 et seq., 152 et
seq., 174 et seq.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 1 to 53, 63 et
seq., 99 et seq., 152 et seq., 163 et seq.
A.L.R. — Infant's misrepresentation as to
his age as estopping him from disaffirming his
voidable transaction, 29 A.L.R.3d 1270.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Power of court sitting as trier of fact to dis-

miss at close of plaintiff's evidence notwithstanding plaintiff has made out prima facie
case, 55 A.L.R.3d 272.
Right to amend pending personal injury action by including action for wrongful death after statute of limitations has run against independent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d 933.
Dismissal of state court action for plaintiffs
failure or refusal to obey court order relating to
pleadings or parties, 3 A.L.R.5th 237.
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 1 to 34, 38 Va
et seq., 76 et seq., 127 et seq., 130 et seq.

Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(a) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that
is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he
shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and
on such issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial.
(2) Designation of unknown defendant When a party does not
know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of
such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be
amended accordingly.
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated
in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown
persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or

Rule 9
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interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so
made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial
establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance
with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading,
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all
Dther averments of material matter.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall
:>e specifically stated.
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not
lecessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generdly that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied
>n, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section
lumber, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision
elied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted,
he party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing
hat the cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this
tate, or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived
rom such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or
rdinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or
ther designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The
ourt shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and slander.
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for
libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to
the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it
is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken
concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so
published or spoken.
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander,
the defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages,
and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence
the mitigating circumstances.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Jle 9, F.R.C.P.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Fraud.
—Forgery.
—General accusations.
Insufficient.
Negligence.
—Materiality of representation.
—Misrepre sentation.
Not properly pleaded.
Properly pleaded.
Judgment.
—Foreign judgment.
Lack of capacity.
—Failure to raise.
Waiver.
—Specific negative averment.
Libel and slander.
—Actual harm.
Mistake.
—Mutual mistake.
Contracts.
Deeds.
Ordinances.
Special damages.
—Accounting.
—Amount.
—Defamation.
—Defined.
—General and special damages.
—Loss of earnings.
—Notice.
—Punitive damages.
Allegations of fraud.
Statute of limitations.
—Pleading.
—Reply.
—Specificity.
Cited.
Fraud.
—Forgery.
While in a general way a forgery is fraudulent, this is not the kind of fraud that Subdivision (b) requires to be pleaded with particularity. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Thorup, 7
Utah 2d 33, 317 P.2d 952 (1957).
—General accusations.
Insufficient
Use of terms "fraud," "conspiracy" and ''negligence" in complaint constituted general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the
pleader which, without the setting out of basic
facts sufficient to constitute the charged actions, would not stand up against a motion to
dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,
372 P.2d 990 (1962).
A complaint in an action for allegedly preventing plaintiff from securing default judgment in prior action was insufficient where the
allegations contained merely broad and general statements that a false affidavit and false
pleadings were filed and judges were contacted, preventing plaintiff from obtaining a
default judgment. Heathman v. Fabian, 14
Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962).
In an action against a county building official, plaintiffs allegation that the official's
8igning of a temporary certificate of occupancy
was a "representation to the citizens" by the

county that the county had taken certain actions under the building code did not specifically allege that the official had intentionally
or recklessly misrepresented any facts to them
and, thus, they failed to state a valid claim for
relief. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah
1995).
Negligence.
General allegation that accounting firm was
negligent in its preparation of financial statement by reason of omissions and inaccuracies
failed to comply with this rule. Milliner v.
Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
—Materiality of representation.
One of the basic elements of pleading a cause
of action based upon fraud is the materiality of
the alleged false representation. In some instances the pleader can meet this requirement
by simply alleging the representation and its
falsity, for by the very nature of the representation it must be either true or false in its entirety. In other instances the materiality of the
allegations is dependent upon the true facts.
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d
988 (1954).
—Misrepresentation.
The requirement in Subdivision (b) that circumstances constituting fraud should be stated
with particularity is not limited to allegations
of common-law fraud and reaches all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term "fraud" in its broadest dimension. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982).
Not properly pleaded.
Plaintiff's claim that defendant obtained a
release from liability by fraud and misrepresentation was not properly pleaded where the
complaint did not allege that the release was
obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, and
the issue as to the validity of the release arose
in plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. Norton
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
Properly pleaded.
Insurance company's answer (to action by insured to recover on policy), which alleged that
insured's answer on insurance application was
fraudulent and material to the acceptance of
the risk and that the insurance company would
not have issued the policy (at least not at that
rate) if the true facts had been made known,
was sufficient and fair notice to put in issue all
of the statutory defenses of deception in
§ 31A-21-105, including an omission, incorrect
statement, and misrepresentation ultimately
found by the jury on a related alcohol question
in a medical history attached to the application. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d
966 (Utah 1982).
Judgment.
—Foreign judgment
Setoff was properly allowed against an Arizona judgment pleaded in Utah. The Arizona
judgment was res judicata insofar as it held
that plaintiff's first cause of action was not
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supported by evidence but it could not be res
judicata as to matters that the Arizona court
expressly refused to determine. Todaro v.
Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 404, 285 P.2d 839 (1955).
Lack of capacity.
—Failure to raise.
Waiver.
Where defendant obtained information substantiating his defense of lack of capacity ten
days prior to trial but waited until last day of
trial to seek introduction of information and
defense, trial court did not err in ruling defendant had waived defense. Hal Taylor Assocs. v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982).
—Specific negative averment.
Pleadings of illegality and lack of subject
matter jurisdiction do not put a party on notice
to respond to a defense of lack of capacity; lack
of capacity defense must be raised by specific
negative averment. Hal Taylor Assocs. v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982).
Defendant waived its right to raise the issue
of plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue where the
pleadings did not contain a specific negative
averment of plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue.
Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah
1983).
Libel and slander.
—Actual harm.
Although Subdivision (j)(l) does not require
a showing of extrinsic facts to support the defamatory words being sued on, it is necessary
to show that, as a consequence of those words,
plaintiff has suffered actual harm. Allred v.
Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979).
Mistake.
—Mutual mistake.
Contracts.
Even though the issue of mutual mistake
vas not raised by the pleadings, it would have
)een proper for the court, in consonance with
lule 54(c)(1), to have reformed the contract if a
nutual mistake of fact had been established by
:lear and convincing evidence. Mabey v. Kay
Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah
.984).
Deeds.
Where, in quiet title action involving dispute
JS to deeds, defendant did not set forth with
»articularity any attack upon the deeds based
n mutual mistake, defendant asserted ownerhip only generally, and in opening statement
efendant's counsel did mention mistake but
id not ask for an amendment of the pleadings
3 properly put mistake before the trial court,
rial court improperly heard parol evidence inmded to modify the deeds and should only
ave examined the face of the deeds in resolvig the dispute. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979
Jtah 1979).
Ordinances.
Court of Appeals took judicial notice of muicipal ordinance, where the information
larging defendant with violating the ordiance referred to the ordinance by its section
umber, and thus complied with Subdivision
) of this rule. Brigham City v. Valencia, 779
.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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Special damages.
—Accounting.
Although Rules of Civil Procedure are to be
liberally construed, some degree of specificity
must be had in order to guide the parties and
the court in their preparation and deliberations; therefore it was error to award compensatory damages, in action for accounting of
partnership profits, based on unpleaded and
highly speculative matters such as distress,
anxiety, and the effect on profits if the one
partner's experience and contacts had been utilized. Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270
P.2d 456 (1954).
—Amount.
The law does not require a party to plead
specifically the exact dollar amount of special
damages. Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991).
—Defamation.
In action for libel and slander it was not necessary for plaintiff to plead special damages in
order to recover for suffering inflicted upon his
mind and emotions. Prince v. Peterson, 538
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975).
—Defined.
Special damages are damages that are a natural consequence of the injury caused but that
do not necessarily flow from the harmful act.
Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151
(1991).
—General and special damages.
General damages are those which naturally
and necessarily result from the harm described
and so are said to be implied in law; special
damages are those which are not so certain as
to be implied in law, but must be pleaded so as
to let the adversary know what will be involved. Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306
(Utah 1975).
General damages are those that are the natural and necessary result of the wrongful act or
omission asserted as the basis of liability; special damages are the natural, but not the necessary, result of an injury. Phillips v. JCM
Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983).
—Loss of earnings.
Loss of earnings to date of trial and impairment of earning capacity are both items of special damages, but they may be proved under an
allegation of general damages where the description of the injuries is such that everyone
must know that of necessity there would be a
loss of earnings and an impairment of earning
capacity. Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d
306 (Utah 1975).
—Notice.
In Utah there is no inflexible rule regarding
the pleading of special damages; it is a question of whether or not the pleadings contain
such information as will apprise the defendant
of the special damages which must of necessity
flow from that which is alleged. Cohn v. J.C.
Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975).
One claiming special damages must plead
each type of damage specifically so that the
opposing party has an adequate opportunity to
defend against the plaintiff's claims. Hodges v.
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991).
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—Punitive damages.
Allegations of fraud.
Failure to allege and prove a tort for which
compensatory damages would be allowed precluded award of punitive damages; since general allegation of fraud did not establish entitlement to compensatory damages, award of
punitive damages was improper. Graham v.
Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P.2d 456 (1954).
Statute of limitations.
—Pleading.
The defense of statute of limitations was not
available unless pleaded. Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 Utah 158, 2 P.2d 107 (1931). (It
was otherwise as to actions against administrators. Gulbranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah 115,
222 P. 590 (1923)).
—Reply.
Defendant's plea of statute of limitations
was deemed, in law, to have been denied by
plaintiff. Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47,
44 P. 652 (1896); Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99
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P. 1003 (1909); Tate v. Shaw, 35 Utah 240, 99
P. 1007 (1909).
—Specificity.
Contention that party failed to plead the specific subdivision of the section relied upon
would not be considered on appeal where question was raised for the first time, and in any
event no one could have been misled. Attorney
Gen. v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277,
114 A.L.R. 726 (1937).
Defendant's pleading of the statute of limitations generally without designating the sections of the statute or statutes upon which he
relied was not in accordance with Subdivision
(h) and therefore was an inadequate plea.
Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d
70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970).
Cited in Battistone v. American Land &
Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980);
Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations
and Clubs § 57; 19. Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§§ 2220, 2225; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 819
et seq.; 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit
§§ 424 to 427; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 403, 422 et seq.; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 459; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§§ 27, 34 to 40; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§
9 to 14, 40, 53 to 56, 86 to 88; 65 Am. Jur. 2d
Quieting Title § 69.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations § 35; 19
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 1327, 1334; 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 131; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander
§§ 128 et seq., 148 et seq.; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 269 et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parties §§ 115, 117; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 8, 21,
22, 25, 27, 33, 76, 80, 86; 74 C.J.S. Quieting
Title §§ 56, 63; 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 445, 446.
A.L.R. — Recovery of punitive damages in
action by purchasers of real property charging
fraud or misrepresentation, 19 A.L.R.4th 801.

Reports of pleadings as within privilege for
reports of judicial proceedings, 20 A.L.R.4th
576.
Amendment of pleading after limitation has
run, so as to set up subsequent appointment as
executor or administrator of plaintiff who professed to bring the action in that capacity without previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th
198.
Plaintiffs rights to punitive or multiple
damages when cause of action renders both
available, 2 A.L.R.5th 449.
Key Numbers. — Associations *=* 20(5);
Corporations «=» 513(4), 514; Damages «=» 142;
Libel and Slander *» 77 et seq., 90 et seq.; Limitation of Actions «=» 183; Parties ** 72 to 74;
Pleading «=> 8(1), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18),
14, 32, 39, 46, 59, 63; Quieting Title *=» 34(3);
Statutes <*=» 280.

Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the
pleading or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the
name of the first party on each side with an indication that there are other
parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any name
and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition toj motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 AL.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.KR.Sd 335
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner m
which
they are
written,
10 A.L.R.3d view
501. by
Prejudicial
effect
of unauthorized
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
J u r y t r i a l w a iver as binding on later state
c i v i l t r i a l > 4 8 A.L.R.4th 747.
C o u r t r e p 0 r t e r ' 8 death or disability prior to
transcribing n o tes as grounds for reversal or
*? A L R 4 * h 1049
new M
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
new
d Qn
d
f inade_
°
,
r ,
c A T ^ c ,,
quacy
875. of damages-modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
, Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of seam a n in
actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers* Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq.,
HO, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
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obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief-"
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney,
No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—-Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.

Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
"Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Where a defendant's motion to set aside
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7)
and his motion for a new trial claimed that
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions
by not providing defendant with a copy of
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his
motion for summary judgment to defendant,
which the latter claimed was a clear showing
offraudon plaintiffs part, the trial court could
have believed in denying defendant's motion,
that fraud was not present in what could be
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without
fully understanding its consequences was correctly characterized by trial court as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdivision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) applied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and
could not be used to circumvent the threemonth filing period. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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—Default judgment
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to relieve a defendant from default and
allow her to answer where it was shown that
she had mistakenly believed that she was fully
protected by a divorce decree and felt that such
decree required her husband to bear the obligation and defend the action for her. Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956).
Trial judge did not abuse discretion in refusing to set aside default judgment where defendant asserted that he thought the summons
was invalid and therefore paid no attention to
it. Board of Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384
P.2d 806 (1963).
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor
granting relief from a default judgment, unless
it appears that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).
Subdivision (b)(7) did not apply in a case
where defendant husband sought to set aside a
default judgment of divorce 5 2/s months after
its entry on the grounds that plaintiff wife had
incorrectly stated the extent of his assets, and
that he had not received a copy of the amended
divorce decree; therefore the court had no jurisdiction to disturb the judgment. Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976).
Where defendant stated he failed to answer
complaints due to naivete regarding the legal
process but admitted that he had discussed the
complaint with an attorney, had failed to deliver necessary documents to the attorney, and
had never paid the attorney, it was not abuse
of discretion for court to refuse to set aside default judgment against defendant "for any
other reason justifying relief." J.P.W. Enters.,
Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979).
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default
judgment pursuant to Subdivision (b) on three
occasions before three different judges and his
motions were denied in the first two proceedings, the third judge was barred by the law of
the case from overruling the previous orders.
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
Impossibility of compliance with a court order, such as an order that the defendant return
property he has already sold, is an appropriate
basis for amendment of the order. Corbett v.
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985).
—Incompetent counsel.
The provisions of Subdivision (b)(7) are sufficiently broad to permit a court to set aside an
order, dismissing a plaintiffs complaint, which
was entered upon an assumption that the
plaintiff was procrastinating and not answering interrogatories submitted to him and to enter a new order based upon the record before it
that plaintiff was represented by incompetent
counsel and that defendants were not being
unduly prejudiced. Stewart v. Sullivan, 29
Utah 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74 (1973).
—Lack of due process.
A party claiming and establishing a lack of
due process of law would be entitled to relief
from a judgment under Subdivision (b)(7) even
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after the expiration of three months, because
relief from a judgment on account of a lack of
due process of law is not expressly provided for
by this rule. Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras,
11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (1961).
—Merits of case.
Where defendant, in his reasons for setting
aside default judgment, asserted that the judgment entered was based upon a void contract
for the reason that the contract did not comply
with the statute of frauds, such assertion went
to the merit of the case and could not be considered on motion to set aside judgment. Board of
Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806
(1963).
—Mistake or inadvertence.
Subdivision (b)(7) may not be used to circumvent the three-month filing period where the
basis for the relief from judgment is based on
mistake or inadvertence. Pitts v. McLachlan
567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977).
Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule is not available
to one who should have filed under Subdivision
(b)(1) but did not do so within the three-month
time limitation. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson,
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).
The provisions of Subdivision (b)(7) may not
be used to circumvent the time limitation on
motions pursuant to Subdivision (b)(1). Gardiner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429
(Utah 1982).
Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule may not be resorted to for relief when the ground asserted
for relief falls within Subdivision (b)(1) since
the three-month limitation on relief under
Subdivision (b)(1) would be averted. Russell v.
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).
The three-month period allowed for Subdivision (b)(1) motions may not be circumvented by
filing a motion under Subdivision (b)(7).
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
—Mutual mistake.
The legal descriptions in an otherwise final
partition decree could be corrected under this
rule because the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that a mutual mistake
occurred in the drafting of the decree, since the
partitioning judge did not intend to deprive the
claimants of access to a major part of their
properties. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431
(Utah 1993).
—Real party in interest
In action by corporation for legal services
rendered, trial court's denial of defendant's motion to set aside default judgment on grounds
plaintiff was not the real party in interest, under Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule, was supported by evidence that plaintiff was the real
party in interest and that defendant had
knowledge thereof. Robinson v. Myers, 599
P.2d 513 (Utah 1979).
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Defendant's motion captioned "Motion for
Return of Fine, Costs and Fees and Notice of
Hearing," filed twenty days after the order of
dismissal of the criminal case against him, although not specified as such, was the proper
subject of a motion under Subdivision (b)(1)
and also sufficient to invoke Subdivision (b)(7)

181

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 60

relief. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. order that the order as prepared by counsel correctly reflected his judgment was a mistake of
App. 1994).
a perfunctory or clerical nature which the
Appeals.
An order denying relief under Subdivision court could and properly did correct upon its
(b) is a final appealable order. Moreover, im- own motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah
proper or untimely motions do not toll the time 2d 196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956).
for appeal from final orders. Arnica Mut. Ins. —Predating of new trial motion.
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App.
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc pre1989).
dating a motion for new trial that is untimely
filed so that the motion will be timely. Kettner
Clerical mistakes.
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962).
—Computation of damages.
Where damage award was based on the sum Court's discretion.
of four separate amounts listed in a letter exThe trial court is afforded broad discretion in
hibit, and the sum of the amounts was in error, ruling on a motion for relief from judgment
the error was within the definition of a clerical under Subdivision (b), and its determination
mistake and was subject to correction by the will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretrial court. Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. tion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.
Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).
App. 1989).
—Correction after appeal.
Default judgment.
Trial court may correct clerical error made
Once a default judgment has been entered, it
in recording of decree after Supreme Court has can only be set aside in accordance with Subdiaffirmed erroneous decree on appeal. Bagnall vision (b). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
1978).
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Date of judgment.
—Admissions.
Void judgment.
Subdivision (b) does not provide that as part
Where later judgment was void and different
from earlier valid judgment, no appeal could be of the order setting aside a judgment any adtaken on ground that defendants were appeal- missions are also set aside; those matters are
ing from the earlier judgment and that inser- covered exclusively by a motion made as protion of date of void judgment was merely a cler- vided by Rule 36(b). Whitaker v. Nikols, 699
ical error which court could correct. Nunley v. P.2d 685 (Utah 1985).
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, Form of motion.
388 P.2d 798 (1964).
Trial court did not err in vacating judgment
—Estate record.
in response to defendants' supplemental stateThe correction of the record in an estate is ment of objections, which, though clearly misproperly made in the probate court in which labeled, was the functional equivalent of a mothe errors occurred, and the court was justified tion to set aside the judgment under Subdiviin accepting parol evidence as to the incorrect- sion (b), was filed in contemplation of the rule,
ness of the record. Harmston v. Harmston, 5 contained the same kindB of arguments and asUtah 2d 357, 302 P.2d 270 (1956).
sertions one would normally expect to find in a
—Inherent power of courts.
motion to set aside the judgment, and was
The courts of this state had recognized the treated by the trial court as such a motion.
inherent right of a court to enter a judgment Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct.
nunc pro tunc to correct clerical errors. Frost v. App. 1991).
Although a motion entitled "Clarification of
District Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 96
Judgment" was not specifically provided for in
Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938).
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because the
—Intent of court and parties.
The correction contemplated by Subdivision substance of the motion was to make clear a
(a) of this rule must be undertaken for the pur- judgment that was not already clear, the mopose of reflecting the actual intention of the tion was sufficient to invoke Subdivision (b) of
court and parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d this rule. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
401 (Utah 1984).
A motion to reconsider the final judgment of
—Judicial error distinguished.
the district court is not provided for under the
The distinction between a judicial error and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and has never
a clerical error does not depend upon who made been recognized as a proper motion in this
it; rather, it depends on whether it was made state. Wisden v. Bangerter, 893 P.2d 1057
in rendering the judgment (judicial error) or in (Utah 1995).
recording the judgment as rendered (clerical
error). Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, Fraud.
471 P.2d 143 (1970).
—Burden of proof.
Question of whether an error is "judicial" or
Trial court properly refused to cancel a deed
"clericar depends not on who made it, but on executed as part of a property settlement when
whether it was made in rendering the judg- it found that plaintiff did not prove that she
ment or in recording the judgment. Lindsay v. had reasonably relied on the alleged represenAtkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984).
tations of her ex-husband when agreeing to ex—Order prepared by counsel.
ecute the deed. Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d
Erroneous assumption by judge in signing 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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•—Divorce action.
Motion to set aside provisions of divorce decree concerning child custody and support
based upon allegation that wife had perpetuated a fraud upon the court by falsely claiming
husband was child's father did not comply with
Subdivision (b) and should have been denied.
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494
P.2d 283 (1972).
The wife in a divorce action was entitled to
have the decree set aside on the ground of
fraud where the assets of the parties may have
been more than five times the amount disclosed by the husband who prevented the wife
from gaining full and accurate knowledge of
his total assets by transferring his corporate
holdings to family members without relinquishing control of those assets, by
understating the true value of jointly held
property, and by avoiding compliance with
court-ordered discovery. Boyce v. Boyce, 609
P.2d 928 (Utah 1980).
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
Constitutionality of state income tax rates
could only be raised in independent action and
not in supplemental proceedings upon warrant
for judgment for underpayment of income
taxes. State Tax Comm'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d
634 (Utah 1979).
—Divorce decree.
Where ex-husband brought independent action in equity seeking relief from that part of
divorce decree naming him father of unborn
child and ordering payments for its support, on
ground that child was not his, court properly
ordered taking of blood test, and upon showing
that ex-husband could not be father, properly
granted relief sought. Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d
704 (Utah 1977).
—Fraud or duress.
Where "fraud upon the court" is the gravamen of a proceeding to relieve a party of the
effect of a judgment, such proceeding must be
pursued in an independent action by filing a
separate suit, and not by way of motion in the
original action. Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d
222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959).
The three-month limitation period does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent common-law action to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud or duress after the
three-month period has expired. Rather, the
doctrine of laches and other equitable principles determine the time within which the action must be brought. St. Pierre v. Edmonds,
645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982).
This rule does not limit the power of the
court to entertain an independent action based
on fraud. Despain v. Despain, 682 P.2d 849
(Utah 1984).
—Motion distinguished.
Where plaintiff filed separate, independent
action to vacate six-year-old divorce decree,
but reverted to procedure for motion in the
original action and trial court dealt with the
matter as having been made on motion only,
plaintiffs "action" became a motion to set aside
judgment and, as such, was properly dismissed
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as having been filed beyond the statutory deadline. Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah
1979).
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Where original summons designated a court
which, because of the amount in controversy,
could not have had jurisdiction and summons
was improperly amended without notice to defendant to indicate court with jurisdiction and
where the complaint had been filed, defendant
was entitled to relief from default judgment in
latter court based on ground there had been no
valid service of summons. Utah Sand & Gravel
Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402
P.2d 703 (1965).
Inequity of prospective application.
The third clause in Subdivision (b)(6) provides a basis for relief from a judgment that
has prospective application when subsequent
events have occurred making enforcement of
the judgment's prospective application no longer equitable. Party who claimed that the judgment never was equitable but that he did not
realize its inequity until later, but who did not
allege that any subsequent event had rende'red
the prospective application of the judgment no
longer equitable, was not entitled to relief under Subdivision (b)(6). Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Jurisdiction.
The trial court has jurisdiction to consider a
Subdivision (b) motion while an appeal is pending. If the trial court finds the motion to be
without merit, it may enter an order denying
the motion, and the parties may appeal from
that order. If, however, the trial court is inclined to grant the motion, counsel should obtain a brief memorandum to that effect from
the trial court, and request an order of remand
from the appellate court so that the trial court
can enter an order. Baker v. Western Sur. Co.,
757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); White v.
State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990).
A trial court has no jurisdiction to consider
the merits of an untimely motion under Subdivision (b)(1). Richins v. Delbert Chipman &
Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
—Default judgment.
A refusal to set aside a default divorce decree
was not an abuse of discretion where the conduct of the party in default indicated absence
of good faith and where the granting of relief
would work an injustice upon the opposing
party. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303
P.2d 995 (1956).
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to deny a motion for relief from a default
judgment where there was evidence that plaintiffs attorney had called the defendant's attorney several days before the default and reminded him that the matter was in default and
in view of the fact that the plaintiff, an elderly
woman, had traveled from Seattle, Washington, to be present and presented an accounting
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at the default hearing. Masters v. LeSeuer, 13
Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 (1962).
Default judgments should have been set
aside where stockholders seeking an opportunity to protect their interest in actions against
corporation, showed that process was served on
person resigning as president, sending notices
to only two other remaining directors when
there was no active management functioning;
that shareholders' group attempted to form a
reorganization committee and hired counsel
two days after final day for answering; and
counsel on day of appointment, having been
refused an opportunity to answer, filed motions
to set aside default judgments. Mayhew v.
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376
P.2d 951 (1962).
A default certificate may be set aside upon
the grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v.
Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962).
Refusal to set aside default judgment on
ground of excusable neglect was not error
where defendant failed to contact his counsel
from February to time of trial in September,
and counsel did not attempt to contact defendant until ten days before trial even though
both had long been informed of approximate
time of trial, notwithstanding claim that counsel was unable to contact defendant due to defendant's long working hours and his custom of
visiting his wife who was terminally ill with
cancer. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker,
30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973).
Motion for relief from default judgment was
properly denied to cosigner (father) who
claimed that his son was the proper defendant
and took no steps to file an answer to the complaint. Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534
P.2d 616 (Utah 1975).
A trial court is justified in denying relief
from a default judgment because of lack of
timely request, long passage of time before
making such request, general procedural neglect, urgence of hypertechnicality about a
statute, or an almost complete absence of substance or merit in the relief for which he
prayed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1975).
Motion to set aside default judgment was
properly denied in case where defendant offered no reasonable excuse for his nonappearance, failed to respond to repeated attempts to
contact him regarding status of the lawsuit he
knew was pending, and knew that a hearing
had been scheduled and that his counsel had
withdrawn. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855
(Utah 1979).
Where defendant claimed default judgment
was due to his attorney's failure to communicate with him, and the record showed that defendant failed to contract his attorney for one
and half years after he filed his answer and
counterclaim, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to set
aside the default judgment. Gardiner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982).
In order for defendant to be relieved from a
default judgment, he must not only show that
the judgment was entered against him through
any reason specified in Subdivision (b), but he
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must also show that his motion to set aside the
judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to the action. A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would
have resulted in a judgment different from the
one entered. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1983).
Default judgment should not have been entered in tort case arising out of injuries inflicted upon plaintiff by defendant where contradictions surrounding adequacy of service of
process and other factors resulted in genuine
mistake on part of defendant, in the absence of
which the default would not have occurred.
May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984).
Default judgment was proper where statements of defendant demonstrated indifference
on his part, and lack of diligence in pursuing
his opportunity to defend. Russell v. Martell,
681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).
Neither the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,
§ 78-22a-l et seq., nor this rule, permits a
court to set aside a foreign default judgment
because of alleged inadvertence, mistake, or
neglect absent a showing of fraud or the lack of
jurisdiction or due process in the rendering
state. Data Mgt. Sys. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d
377 (Utah 1985).
Failure to reserve rights under § 70A-3606(l)(a), which governs impairment of recourse or of collateral in regard to commercial
paper and does not apply to judgments, could
not be used to set aside default judgments
against debtors under Subdivision (b)(6) of this
rule. First Sec. Bank v. Aarian Dev. Corp., 738
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987).
Illness.
Illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to
make neglect in failing to defend a cause of
action a ground for vacating a default judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah
416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
Inconvenience.
Mere inconvenience or the press of personal
or business affairs is not deemed as an excuse
for failure to appear at trial. Valley Leasing v.
Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983).
Meritorious.
To be relieved from a default judgment, defendant must not only show that the judgment
was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Subdivision (b)), but he must also show that his motion
to set aside the judgment was timely, and that
his proposed answer contains a defense that is
entitled to be tried. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994).
Merits of claim.
Usually, it is not appropriate on Subdivision
(b) motions to examine the merits of the claim
decided by the default judgment. Larsen v.
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
Negligence of attorney.
An oral promise made by the attorney for the
plaintiff to the effect that defendant could have
more time in which to answer, where the plaintiff already had obtained a default judgment,
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vas now sufficient excusable neglect so as to
illow the vacation of the default judgment. The
lefendants were deprived of nothing by the alleged promise inasmuch as the default judgment had already been entered. Such a promise could in no way bind a client who already
had a judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
Where defendant's counsel withdrew at pretrial conference and defendant claimed it received no notice to appoint counsel and had no
notice of trial until it received notice of default
judgment, the default was set aside in the interest of justice, the court stating that where
there is doubt about whether a default should
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of doing so. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v.
Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980).
Where plaintiffs attorney and insurance adjuster for defendant's insurance company were
engaged in settlement talks at time plaintiffs
petition was filed, defendant was entitled to
relief from subsequent summary judgment on
grounds of "excusable neglect" since plaintiffs
attorney had duty to notify adjuster of potential default and did not do so. Helgesen v.
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981).
Party may not claim his attorney's neglect in
failing to notify him of proceeding as grounds
for setting aside a default judgment where the
party has been negligent by not communicating with his attorney. Gardiner & Gardiner
Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982).
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside a summary judgment after a
failure to observe the rule prescribing the procedure to be followed upon withdrawal of an
attorney had been brought to the attention of
the court. Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah
1984).
The reasons asserted by the defendant for
setting aside the default judgment, that his attorney neglected to file an answer and that he
mistakenly relied on his attorney's assurances
that an answer had been filed, fell within Subdivision (b)(1), not Subdivision (b)(7), and the
defendant's filing of a motion to set aside the
default judgment six months after its entry
was therefore untimely. Lincoln Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d
672 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
No claim for relief.
Trial court abused its discretion in conditioning the setting aside of a default judgment
against defendant upon his payment of attorney fees where plaintiffs complaint was fundamentally flawed in that it appeared clearly
upon the face of the complaint that no claim for
relief was stated. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979).
—Delayed motion for new trial.
In furtherance of their discretion to grant
relief "in furtherance of justice," district courts
could allow a notice of motion for new trial to
be filed, after the prescribed time limit when a
proper application and sufficient showing
therefor was made. Audia v. Denver &
R.G.R.R., 45 Utah 459,146 P. 559 (1915); Lund
v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake
County, 90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278 (1936).
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Party seeking relief "in furtherance of justice" to permit tardy filing of notice of motion
for new trial hajd to do more than merely move
the court to act and file the necessary affidavits in support of motion for a new trial; the
applicant had to produce proper evidence upon
which the court could base findings that
through no fault of his he was prevented from
filing notice of motion for a new trial within
the time fixed by the statute, and had to produce satisfactory evidence why he did not apply for an extension of time at some time
within the statutory limitation. Lund v. Third
Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake County,
90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278 (1936).
—Factual error.
Correcting a description of real property to
conform to the court's ruling, when the legal
ruling remained unchanged, was a justifiable
reason to change the original order under Subdivision (b). Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—-Failure to rile cost bill.
Whether party would be relieved from neglect in failing to file timely cost bill was
within discretion of trial court. Hirsh v. Ogden
Furn. & Carpet Co., 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318
(1918).
—Failure to tile notice of appeal.
Neither Rule 6(b), granting the court power
to extend where a failure to act in time is due
to "excusable neglect" generally, nor Subdivision (b)(1) authorizing the court to relieve from
a final judgment for inadvertence or excusable
neglect, applies where the notice of appeal has
not been filed in time. Anderson v. Anderson, 3
Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955); Holbrook v.
Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970).
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
The fact that his counsel did not receive notice and findings from the clerk of the court
does not entitle an appellant to file out of time
a motion to amend findings and decree, and a
motion for a new trial. In re Bundy's Estate,
121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952).
—Trial court's discretion.
Trial court has discretion in determining
whether a movant has shown ''mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," and
the Supreme Court will reverse the trial
court's ruling only when there has been an
abuse of discretion. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d
52 (Utah 1984).
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
An administrative law judge's refusal to consider an employer's untimely protest of a determination of benefits by the department of employment security did not contravene a
claimed public policy to relieve a party of default for "mistake" or "excusable neglect."
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d
130 (Utah 1987).
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Supreme Court could not relieve applicant
from operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act section prescribing the time within
which a writ of certiorari had to be applied for;
fact that applicant's counsel was misinformed
by commission's stenographer that there had
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been no decision did not authorize granting of —Erroneously included damages.
Defendant, whose insurance company had
relief. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73
satisfied judgment against him in automobile
Utah 199, 273 P. 306 (1928).
accident action which erroneously included
Newly discovered evidence.
amounts plaintiff had received as PIP benefits
—Burden of proof.
under its insurance policy, could not seek to
The burden of showing facts to justify the modify judgment to exclude erroneously ingranting of a new trial is upon one seeking cluded amount by way of motion pursuant to
such relief. Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, either Subdivisions (b)(6) or (7). Laub v. South
375 P.2d 28 (1962).
Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah
—Discretion not abused.
1982).
District court held not to abuse its discretion
in denying motion for new trial based on —Prospective application of judgment.
Rule permitting relief from a judgment on
''newly discovered evidence." See Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983); Putvin v. the basis that it is no longer equitable that the
Thompson, 241 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Ct. judgment have prospective application was inapplicable between the parties when the judgApp. 1994).
ment had been satisfied by the party seeking
Procedure.
relief. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n,
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982).
—Notice to parties.
Motion to reconsider a motion is not provided Timeliness of motion.
for under these rules, but even if it were, trial
A motion to set aside a judgment that is
court erred in hearing defendant's motion and
acting upon it ex parte and without any notice based on a reversed judgment must be made
to plaintiff. Utah State Employees Credit within a reasonable time. Guardian State
Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989).
Motion by natural mother to dismiss an
(1970).
adoption petition on the grounds of misrepreRes judicata.
sentation by the adoptive parents, filed more
A denial of a motion under this rule pre- than three months after the entry of her concludes a subsequent collateral attack on the sent to the adoption, was not timely, and the
judgment only if the claim or ground actually saving clause of this rule did not apply because
adjudicated in the Rule 60(b) motion is the she did not bring an independent action. M.L.
same claim asserted in the independent action. v. V.H., 894 P.2d 1285 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 801 P.2d 144
—Confused mental condition of party.
(Utah 1990).
There was no abuse of discretion in trial
Reversal of judgment.
court's denial of plaintiffs motion to vacate or—Invalidation of sale.
der dismissing action entered pursuant to reWhere real estate agent was granted default lease and stipulation of parties where motion
judgment against purchaser of home for uncol- was filed six and one-half years after plaintiffs
lected commission from sale, subsequent inval- physician detected plaintiffs confused mental
idation of purchaser's and seller's sales con- condition urged as basis for vacating motion.
tract warranted vacation of default judgment Young v. Western Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d
upon purchaser's motion. Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 394 (Utah 1984).
2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956).
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
Where the evidence indicated that plaintiff
—Accord and satisfaction.
had not gotten in touch with his attorney for
A judgment defendant is not constrained to two years after filing complaint, it was proper
raise an alleged accord and satisfaction only as for court to deny plaintiffs motion to set aside
an affirmative defense to further attempts by a a judgment, dismissing his complaint for lack
judgment creditor to enforce the terms of a of prosecution. Pitman v. Bonham, 677 P.2d
judgment. Rather, the issue may be raised 1126 (Utah 1984).
seeking direct judicial sanction of the satisfacA trial court's refusal to set aside a dismissal
tion by motion or independent action pursuant for failure to prosecute will not be overturned
to Subdivision (b)(6). Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. absent an abuse of discretion. Meadow Fresh
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980).
Farms v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of Agric, 813
When a judgment creditor accepted a prom- P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
issory note with greater consideration and difTrial court did not abuse its discretion in referent performance from the earlier judgment, fusing to set aside a dismissal for failure to
he released the judgment debtorfromthe judg- prosecute, where the underlying events ocment in an accord and satisfaction. Brimley v. curred in 1981, an initial action filed in 1983
Gasser, 754 P.2d 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the
—Discharging representative of estate instant action based on the same facts was not
filed until 1988, by which time many of the
from further demand.
Relief under this rule is available with re- potential witnesses might have moved out of
gard to an order under § 75-3-1001 discharg- state and/or their recollection of the circuming a personal representative of an estate from stances and events might have dimmed.
further claim or demand after a final order has Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ.
been entered. Morgan v. Zions Nat'l Bank, 711 Dept. of Agric, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App.
P.2d 261 (Utah 1985).
1991).
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-Fraud.
A cross-complaint seeking to set aside a
ldgment for fraud in its procurement may be
rought after the time limit in Subdivision (b)
Dr a motion to set aside a judgment. Bowen v.
)lson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
Motion by ex-husband to order paternity
ilood test to furnish evidence on possible modiication of support decree, based on fraud on
ourt, was governed by time limit in this rule
md was too late when filed 14V2 months after
livorce decree, even though baby was unborn
md blood test could not have been performed
>efore the divorce. McGavin v. McGavin, 27
Jtah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972).
-Invalid service.
The three-months provision provided for in
Subdivision (b) for motions to vacate a judgnent has no application to a judgment which is
roid because of invalid service of summons.
.Voody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249,461 P.2d 465
1969).
Where the judgment is void because of a
'atally defective service of process, the time
limitations of Subdivision (b) have no application. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah
L986).
—Judicial error.
Where judgment contained no clerical error
amendable under Subdivision (a) but may have
contained judicial error, trial court erred in
granting motion to amend the judgment filed
nine years after judgment was entered, since
the error was not corrected by timely motion
for new trial, appeal or suit in equity. Richards
v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143
(1970).
—Jurisdiction.
In suit for injunction, wherein it appeared
that parties stipulated that hearing on damages be deferred and tried later, and court
made order that plaintiff might later file
amended or supplemental complaint with respect to issue of damages, district court did not
lose jurisdiction of case because damage issue
was not determined during term of court at
which injunction was granted and no application for relief "in furtherance of justice" was
made within six months after term. Utah Oil
Ref. Co. v. District Court, 60 Utah 428, 209 P.
624 (1922).
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
A motion under Subdivision (b)(1) to set
aside a default judgment on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect of
one's attorney, if made more than three
months after the judgment was entered, is untimely and properly denied. Peck v. Cook, 29
Utah 2d 375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973).
—Newly discovered evidence.
Father's petition to reopen a divorce judgment, based on newly discovered evidence, to
raise the issue of paternity of a child born during the marriage was procedurally deficient
and properly denied by the trial court where
the petition was not filed within three months
of the divorce judgment. Roche v. Roche, 596
P.2d 647 (Utah 1979).
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—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
A formal order signed and entered upon the
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a
direction of the court theretofore made after
hearing on the merits is more than a mere inadvertence, and can therefore be set aside more
than three months after its entry, provided the
motion is made within a reasonable time.
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211.
(1952).
—"Reasonable time."
Because a losing party moved to set aside the
judgment against her within about a month
after learning that the judgment had been entered, and her ignorance of the judgment until
that time was due in part to a lack of notice
that the prevailing party was required to provide pursuant to Rule 58A(d), her motion was
timely under Subdivision (b). Workman v.
Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Although Utah has no statutory limitation
period specific to adoptions, in recognition of
the need for finality in adoption proceedings,
court held that plaintiff's action, brought three
and one-half years after adoption order was
granted, was not brought within a "reasonable
time" under Subdivision (b). Maertz v. Maertz,
827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
—Reconsideration of previously denied
motion.
Trial court committed no error by first denying a motion for summary judgment made by
the defendant, and then upon subsequent proceedings within the time limits of Subdivision
(b) deciding to vacate that order and reconsidering and granting defendant's motion. Rees v.
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978).
—Satisfaction.
The fact of prior satisfaction of the judgment
is an important consideration in determining
whether a motion to modify the judgment is
made within a reasonable time. Laub v. South
Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah
1982).
Unauthorized appearance.
Wife who had been personally served with
process but had no actual knowledge of action
was not entitled to relief from judgment
against her and her husband on ground that
appearance for her by attorney retained by
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff
would have been entitled to default judgment
against wife, and his position could not be
worsened by unauthorized appearance over
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham,
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972).
Void judgment
—Basis.
A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties or was otherwise
incompetent to render judgment; a judgment
based on a void stipulation may be voidable,
but is not void within the meaning of Subdivision (b)(5). Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons,
817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Lack of jurisdiction.
It is a basic rule that a judgment is void and
subject to collateral attack if lack of jurisdiction in the court appears on the face of the
record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d
602 (1952).
Where the affidavit for publication of summons presented no evidentiary facte, a default
judgment entered against the defendant can be
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment
under Subdivision (b) is ordinarily reversed
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when
a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court
has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the
judgment cannot stand without denying due
process to the one against whom it runs. State
Dept. of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130
(Utah 1989).
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v.
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Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac,
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc.,
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v.
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v.
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St.
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982);
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983);
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions
First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Fair, 770 P.2d
131 (Utah 1989); Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rupp,
833 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Holm v.
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 740 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq.,
237.
A.L.R. — Incompetence of counsel as ground
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64
A.L.R.4th 323.
Filing of notice of appeal as affecting jurisdiction of state trial court to consider motion to
vacate judgment, 5 A.L.R.5th 422.
Relief from judicial error by motion under
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 771.
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956.
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or
other parts of the records and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 794.
Independent actions to obtain relief from
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558.
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error,
as rendering federal district court judgment
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R.
Fed. 831.
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 165.
Who has burden of proof in proceeding under
Rule 60(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to have default judgment set aside on
ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction,
102 A.L.R. Fed. 811.
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing relief from final judgment where its prospective application is inequitable, 117 A.L.R.
Fed. 419.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *=» 294 et seq.,
306, 307.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 61, F.R.C.P.

Rule 24

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

456

of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon
the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule
for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Allegation of facts required.
Because defendant did not allege any facts in
support of his ineffective assistance claim, the
appellate court would not remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper

to remand a claim under this rule for a fishing
expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P. 943 (Utah
1993).

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on p. separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with
page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in
the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate
citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to
the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
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(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of
the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the
brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance
to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly
published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum
decision, the transcript of the courts oral decision, or the contract or
document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the
appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may
be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of
any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made to the
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is
in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall
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then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues
raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not
exceed 25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second
brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of
contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by
permission of the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good
cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The briefif
must now contain for each issue raised on ap->peal, a statement of the applicable standard of>f
review and citation of supporting authority.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-Iment, effective October 1, 1992, added thee
third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made sty-rlistic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7).
The 1994 amendment added the addendumQ
requirement in Subdivision (a)(2); added Sub->divisions (a)(5)(A) and (B); inserted "or of cen-it a l importance to the appeal" in Subdivisionti
!a)(6); inserted "including the grounds for re-iviewing any issue not preserved in the trialL1
jourt" in Subdivision (9); added Subdivisionti
a)(ll), deleted Subdivision (f), relating to re-5)roduction of statutes, documents, and similarr

material, and made related changes throughout the rule; added Subdivision (b)(2); deleted a
reference to Subdivision (a)(6) from the citation near the end of Subsection (c); deleted the
reporter's transcript from the list in the first
sentence in Subdivision (e) and substituted
"record" for "transcript" near the end of the
last sentence; and made stylistic changes
throughout.
The 1995 amendment added the provision
for cases reviewed on certiorari in Subdivision
(a)(ll); added the second sentence in Subdivision (f); and, in Subdivision (g), added the 50page limit, substituted "apellee/cross-appellant" for "appellee" in the third sentence, and
all the language beginning with the fourth
sentence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutional arguments.
Contents.
—Argument.
-Inappropriate language.
-Standard of review.
-Statement of facts with citation to record.
failure to file.

—Defective appeal.
Properly documented argument.
Reply brief.
Cited.
Constitutional arguments.
In order to make an argument for an innovative interpretation of a state constitutional
provision textually similar to a federal provi-
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sion, the following points should be developed
and supported with authority and analysis.
First, counsel should offer analysis of the
unique context in which Utah's constitution
developed with regard to the issue at hand.
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state
appellate courts regularly interpret even
textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal interpretations of the United States Constitution
and that it is entirely proper to do so in our
federal system. Third, citation should be made
to authority from other states supporting the
particular construction urged by counsel. State
v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Contents.
A brief must contain some support for each
contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960
(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Extensive quotations from numerous case
authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot
substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly tied to the record. West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under
the provisions of this rule because it failed to
set forth a coherent statement of issues and the
appropriate standard of review for each issue
with supporting authority, the "issues" where
listed did not correlate with the substance of
the brief, the statement of the case not only
omitted reference to the course of proceedings
and disposition in the trial court, but failed to
provide a statement of the relevant facts properly documented by citations to the record, and
defendant's "argument" did not identify any
error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the
record, or cite applicable authority, much less
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
It is improper to use an addendum to incorporate argument by reference that should be
included in the body of the brief. State v. Jiron,
866 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Appellate orief that set forth little legal
analysis on issue presented, did not specifically
discuss how trial court erred, did not attempt
to marshal the evidence, and presented no citations to record failed to conform to requirements of this rule. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904
P.2d 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
—Argument.
Appellants' brief, containing less than a single page of assertions and no citations to the
record, no legal authorities, and no analysis
whatsoever, was not in compliance with this
nile, which requires the brief of an appellant to
contain an argument. Christensen v. Munns,
812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Court declined to consider argument that
was not adequately briefed. See State v. Yates,
834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Defendant's failure to brief the applicability
of a common law construction (the good faith
exception to the warrant requirement) under
the Utah Constitution at the trial court level
and his subsequent failure to develop any
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meaningful argument thereunder did not permit higher appellate review of these state constitutional claims, but left the analysis to proceed solely under federal constitutional law.
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
—Inappropriate language.
Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no place in an
appellate brief and is of no assistance in attempting to resolve any legitimate issues presented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296
(Utah 1986).
—Standard of review.
The standard of review requirement in Subdivision (a)(5) should not be ignored. The purpose of the requirement is to focus the briefs,
thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency
in the processing of appeals. Christensen v.
Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
—Statement of facts with citation to
record.
The Supreme Court need not, and will not,
consider any facte not properly cited to, or supported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).
The Supreme Court will assume the correctness of the judgment in a criminal trial if counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements as to making a concise statement of
facts and citation of the pages in the record
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982).
If a party fails to make a concise statement
of the facts and citation of the pages in the
record where those facts are supported, the
court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746
P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Steele v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d
960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Failure to file.
—Defective appeal.
Where defendant was convicted of operating
a motor vehicle without insurance, and attempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record,
there was no reversible error presented which
would permit the appellate court to reverse the
judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935 (Utah
1975).
Properly documented argument
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments
did not set forth a properly documented argument as required by this rule; therefore the
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil
Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Reply brief.
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal,
although the court, in its discretion, may decided a case upon any points that its proper
disposition may require, even if first raised in
a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800
P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt,
806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex
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rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical
Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan,
818 P.2d 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State
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v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct App. 1991);
Middlestadt v. Indus. Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d
540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Barney v. Utah
Dep't of Commerce, 885 P.2d 809 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 684 to 690.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 605 et
seq.

Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *=» 755
to 807.

Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem representing a minor
who is not a party to the appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on motion or at the request
of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae or the guardian ad
litem is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or
guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose
position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae or guardian ad litem
will support, unless the court for cause shown otherwise orders. A motion of
an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem to participate in the orai argument will
be granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jm\ 2d Appeal and
Error § 687.

Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs.
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. Briefs shall be deemed filed on the
date of the postmark if first-class mail is utilized. The appellant shall serve
and file a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the
appellate court pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition
of the appeal or a motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance
of counsel has been previously interposed, in which event service and filing
shall be within 30 days from the denial of such motion. The appellee, or in
cases involving a cross-appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant, shall serve and
file a brief within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief. In cases involving cross-appeals, the appellant shall serve and file the second brief described
in Rule 24(g) within 30 days after service of the appellee/cross-appellant's
brief. A reply brief may be served and filed by the appellant or the appeliee/cross-appellant in cases involving cross-appeals. If a reply brief is filed, it
shall be served and filed within 30 days after the filing and service of the
appellee's brief or the appellant's second brief in cases involving cross-appeals,
[f oral argument is scheduled fewer than 35 days after the filing of appellee's
3rief, the reply brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral argument. By
itipulation filed with the court in accordance with Rule 21(a), the parties may
extend each of such periods for no more than 30 days. A motion for enlargenent of time need not accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall be
effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be
extended.
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For matters pending in the
Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an original
dgnature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters
ending in the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which shall
contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court of
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Rule 33

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees,
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is
substantially redrafted to provide definitions
and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court
must award damages. This is in keeping with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the amount of damages — single or
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended
to make express the authority of the court to

impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
—Defined.
—Sanctions.
Cited.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating to alimony and distribution of marital
property was frivolous, where there was no basis for the argument presented and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was
therefore subject to sanction when, after he investigated plaintiff's malpractice action
against defendant orthodontist and found that
he could not prove breach of duty or causation,

the record was devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence showing negligence, and after losing on summary judgment, he persisted in filing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414
(Utah 1990).
An appeal brought from an action that was
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of
Social Serve, v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
Attorney who, after a case had been fully
adjudicated, chose to ignore the decision and
attempted to relitigate the same case violated
Subdivision (a) of this rule and was therefore
subject to sanctions. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal
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is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis. Lack of good faith is not required.
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.
Partnership v Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct
UB
^f?W
VM
'
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Sanctions.
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only
be applied in egregious c s e s , to avoid chilling
the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, sanctions should be imposed
when an appeal is obviously without any merit
and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood ofprevailing.Porcov.Porco, 752 P.2d 365
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
COLLATERAL

Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d
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REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 912.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 637.
A.L.R. — Inherent power of federal district

court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel
in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed.
789.
Key Numbers. — Costs *=» 259 to 263.

Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated,
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or
taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or
prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees
for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party
in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur
is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file
with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The
adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the clerk
of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice
and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment
which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force
and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the
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(c) Minute book. The clerk may keep a minute book, in which shall be
entered a record of the daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare,
under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Presiding
Judge of the Court of Appeals, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In
placing cases on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to
appeals in accordance with the priority of cases provided in Rule 29.
(d) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or decision,
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision.
Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made upon counsel.
(e) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record
or paper to be removed from the court, except as authorized by these rules or
the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to the
court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve copies
of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1,1992, added the Sub-

division (c) designation and heading and redesignated the following subdivisions accordingly.

Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state.
The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar number. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper
and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion,
brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the
purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not
signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the authority
and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may,
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or
person who practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person allowed to appear before the
court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action
to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the State Bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Discipline of the State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to
practice before the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a
member of the Bar of this state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such
attorney shall associate with an active member in good standing of the Bar of
this state and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all other rules
of appellate procedure.
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Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is
amended to require that counsel provide the
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court with counsel's Bar number and business
telephone number.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Award of damages for dilatory tactics in prosecuting appeal in state court, 91
A.L.R.3d 661.
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding post-plea remedies, 13 A.L.R.4th 533.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding appellate and postconviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582.
Attorneys: revocation of state court pro hac
vice admission, 64 A.L.R.4th 1217.
Key Numbers. — Costs *» 252.

TITLE VI.
CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN
COURTS.
Rule 41. Certification of questions of law by United
States courts.
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court
may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United
States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance
with the provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a
proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain.
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United States may invoke this
rule by entering an order of certification as described in this rule. When
invoking this rule, the certifying court may act either sua sponte or upon a
motion by any party.
(c) Certification order.
(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme Court
and shall state:
(A) the question of law to be answered;
(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in a
proceeding pending before the certifying court; and
(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law.
(2) The order shall also set forth all facts which are relevant to the
determination of the question certified and which show the nature of the
controversy, the context in which the question arose, and the procedural
steps by which the question was framed.
(3) The certifying court may also include in the order any additional
reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not otherwise
apparent.
(d) Form of certification order; submission of record. A certification
order shall be signed by the judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to
the certification order and forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court by the clerk
of the certifying court under its official seal. The Supreme Court may require
that all or any portion of the record before the certifying court be filed with
the Supreme Court if the record or a portion thereof may be necessary in
determining whether to accept the certified question or in answering that
question. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the certifying court to
conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record.
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. Upon filing of the certification order and accompanying papers with the clerk, the Supreme Court shall
promptly enter an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to
it, and the clerk shall serve copies of the order upon the certifying court and
all parties identified in the certification order. If the Supreme Court accepts
the question, the Court will set out in the order of acceptance (1) the specific

78-2-1.5

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

JUDICIAL CODE

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981,
ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a s t a t u t e of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face u n d e r the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
m a t t e r s over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a j capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(bj election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(ej matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those m a t t e r s described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
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